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The Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and Firm 
Performance in the Junior Canadian Life Sciences Sector 
By: Robyn Cook 
April 8, 2013 
The relationship between four corporate governance characteristics and six 
measures of firm performance are examined in a sample of sixty-two Life 
Sciences firms listed on Canada’s TSX-Venture stock exchange.  Results from 
univariate and logistic regression analyses support prior corporate governance 
research by demonstrating that the effect of good corporate governance 
structures on firm performance may be contingent on the specific circumstances 
within the firm or even the industry as a whole.  Majority independence of the 
Board of Directors was found to have minor negative impact on firm 
performance.  CEO duality was shown to enhance firm performance as proxied 
by return on assets; this result is contrary to expectations based on the agency 
model of corporate governance, but consistent with this study’s hypothesis. 
Gender diversity of the Board indicated mixed results, showing a negative 
association with firm performance.  Equity ownership by the Board was 
associated with better firm performance.  In sum, this study shows that 
significant associations are present among the selected corporate governance 
factors and relevant measures of performance for junior Canadian Life Sciences 
firms.  These findings should be used as a basis for further investigation which 
may include expanding the sample and the time frame.  Ultimately, this research 
may serve to provide guidance to industry and indicators to investors of future 
















The Life Sciences sector is a key contributor to Canada’s innovation 
economy.  Canadian Life Sciences firms (LSF) create value by continually 
advancing research and development of new products, technologies, and 
services that are highly valued by society as they become realized through 
improvements in medical and healthcare delivery, agri-food, and the 
environment.  LSFs, particularly those on the junior Canadian TSX-Venture 
stock exchange, are often formed to support the development and 
commercialization of novel innovations.  These firms seek public listing status in 
order to gain access to the significant investment funding needed to support the 
weighty hurdles posed by extensive clinical trials and lengthy approval-to-sell 
processes governed by industry regulators.      
The need for significant investment in the junior Canadian LSFs is often 
critical as access to sufficient capital to see the product through to its revenue 
generating stages can make or break firms in this industry sector.  Competition 
for funding is high, particularly in the wake of the turmoil of recent years in the 
global financial systems and the trend towards off-shoring of expensive 
processes such as research and development.  Thus, firms with structures that 
elicit investor confidence have a competitive advantage in the “battle for 
funding”. 
In light of the past decade’s devastating corporate scandals, the value of 
good corporate governance structures to shareholders has become a prominent 
issue.  The principal-agent model (Agency Theory) of corporate governance 
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highlights the problems that occur when ownership and control of the firm is 
separated.  In the context of this model, good corporate practices are intended 
to aid in aligning the interests of the firm’s owners and its managers, ultimately 
creating long term value for the firm’s shareholders.  Thus, their presence could 
provide an indicator to investors of the potential for return on their investments.  
Numerous studies have been conducted in the area of corporate governance 
seeking to establish consistent linkages between corporate governance best 
practices and firm performance (Belkir, 2004; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001; Rouf, 
2011; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006).  To date, no consistent 
model supporting this association has been identified.  The purpose of this 
study is to examine six firm performance measures and determine if any are 
associated with four indicators of “corporate governance best practices” 
specifically in the junior Canadian Life Sciences industry.  Identification of such 
positive associations could be used as a basis for LSFs, helping to design and 
support their corporate structures to drive strong firm performance and gain 
competitive advantage in the view of investors.        
Results from regression analyses support prior corporate governance 
research by demonstrating that the effect of good corporate governance 
structures on firm performance may be contingent on the specific circumstances 
within the firm.  First, a majority of independent directors on the Board was 
found to have little impact on firm performance.  Second, CEO duality was 
shown to enhance firm performance in terms of return on assets. Third, gender 
diversity on the Board showed mixed results, with an inclination towards a 
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negative association with firm performance.  Fourth, equity ownership by the 
Board was found to be associated with better firm performance.   
In conclusion, this study provides preliminary evidence that several 
significant associations exist, linking firm performance with corporate 
governance characteristics in the junior Canadian Life Sciences industry.  It is 
recommended that these findings be used to seek a more definitive answer to 
the central research question by expanding the sample and the time frame.  
Therefore, further research is needed in order to better define the identified 
associations among the variables and provide basic guidance for industry 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
The Life Sciences sector is a key contributor to Canada’s innovation 
economy; creating value by continually advancing societal goals of medical and 
healthcare delivery, agri-food, and the environment (Government of Canada, 
2012; Chataway, Tait, & Wield, 2006).  Thus, this sector’s value to society is 
great, opening untold possibilities to advance public health and wellness, 
making it an attractive investment prospect. Great potential is generally 
accompanied by high risk, an inevitable truth in the Life Sciences industry.  This 
sector’s rapid advancements lead to breakthrough technologies and innovations 
which form the basis for continual research and development (R&D), ownership 
of intellectual property rights, and ultimately, in many cases, a commercially 
viable product pipeline, all potentially lucrative opportunities for the Life 
Sciences firm (LSF) and its shareholders.  On the other hand, LSFs are highly 
regulated and thus, a young firm often requires periodic, significant capital 
injections to sustain it through the R&D phase to prototype development and 
validation, followed by regulatory approval prior to commercialization.  Further, a 
unique combination of scientific, compliance-oriented and business acumen is 
often necessary to support the young firm through its pre-revenue generation 
phases. Evidence of a firm’s ability to attain this balance is valuable to 
shareholders and other stakeholders when considering investment in or 
collaboration/partnership with that firm.     
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Because of the challenging state of the global economy in recent years, 
the Canadian Life Sciences industry has been forced to explore numerous 
options to raise the funds to support the start-up or early stage firm in its quest 
for profitability.  According to a recent report on the Canadian Life Sciences 
industry by PwC and BIOTEC Canada, the commercialization of science is a 
challenge for which fundraising is becoming more difficult as globalization allows 
more research, development and supporting activities to be effectively moved 
offshore (PWC & BIOTECanada, 2011). In this light, it becomes even more 
important that potential investors be able to clearly view, not only the firm’s 
value proposition but also, have confidence in the underlying structures that 
support the firm’s capability for success in both the short and the long run.    
Corporate governance has been well-documented as a central and 
dynamic system whereby an organization is directed and controlled by the set of 
relationships among the company’s management, its Board of Directors, and its 
stakeholders (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010).  Good governance is essentially a 
system of checks and balances intended to protect the welfare of stakeholders 
and drive the organization’s success.  Its presence “clarifies authority, simplifies 
decision–making, and ensures that people and organizations are accountable 
for their decisions,” (Institute on Governance, 2012; Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  
Therefore, evidence of good corporate governance can be a valuable indicator 
of a company’s worthiness of investor and stakeholder confidence.  Its 
prominence as an indicator of the integrity of a firm’s supporting structures over 
the past decade has arisen with the wave of catastrophic corporate failures such 
as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, and others.  However, these scandals also 
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served to highlight the fact that the appearance of good corporate governance 
and/or high quality organizational practices may not necessarily be indicative of 
its true state, since some of these organizations were renowned for what 
appeared to be excellence in corporate governance. As a result, securities laws 
have evolved, becoming more restrictive, particularly in the United States with 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) that set new 
governance standards for Boards and management of publically-traded firms.  
The Canadian response to SOX has been to incorporate much of its context into 
its own decentralized securities regulatory system, using and learning from the 
results of the SOX implementation (Gray, 2005). In particular, Canada’s 
regulatory response to SOX by securities administrators included rules affecting 
auditors’ oversight, personal accountability in terms of CEO and CFO 
certifications of disclosures, audit committee structure and responsibilities, along 
with requirements for specific corporate governance and disclosure controls 
(Sibold, 2009).  The success of this implementation, however, is questionable as 
recent literature indicates that the SOX model may have been inappropriate for 
Canadian securities regulatory policy due to the distinct differences in size, 
structure and composition of the Canadian and American capital markets 
(Sibold, 2009).  It has been noted that the lack of adequate testing of the model 
in Canada prior to implementation accompanied by the lack of critical analysis of 
the underpinnings of SOX (i.e., its reliance on independent directors as effective 
monitors of management) may have precluded a successful implementation 
(Sibold, 2009).  In essence, Canadian securities regulators adopted “a response 
to a solution rather than to a problem,” (Sibold, 2009).        
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Although the effects of good corporate governance practices on firm 
performance have been well investigated by researchers, the results, which are 
discussed in detail below, have been mixed.  A growing body of evidence 
indicates that there is a significant statistical relationship between bad corporate 
governance and poor firm performance (Solomon, 2010; Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999).  Other findings, such as the positive association between the 
prevalence of independent directors and the ability raise capital due to the 
availability of more growth opportunities and financial resources from the 
external environment (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007), are relevant to the current 
state of the Canadian Life Sciences sector and the ability of its firms to succeed 
in advancing societal goals relating to healthcare, food, and the environment.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the association, if any, between a 
selection of the most relevant corporate governance practices and firm 
performance indicators within the junior Canadian Life Sciences industry.  This 
study aims to contribute to the body of literature that seeks to identify linkages 
between good corporate governance practices and firm performance with a 
focus on the Canadian Life Sciences sector.    
Specifically, this study investigates whether firm performance is 
associated with good corporate governance principles in publically-listed, Life 
Sciences companies on the TSX-Venture Exchange (TSX-V).  The firms chosen 
for this study represent those whose core business are mainly focused in 
healthcare and include the design, development and/or manufacturing of 
medical devices and equipment, drugs and/or biologics.   Firms listed on the 
TSX-V exchange in the Life Sciences sector are generally in the early stages of 
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growth, development and commercialization, en route to stable, ongoing 
production and revenue generation. To these firms, financial growth and 
performance is a critical factor determining their ongoing viability and successful 
future growth.   
The contribution of this study to practice is twofold.  First, the 
identification of associations among the selected variables could provide start-
up venture companies in this industry with a framework for development of a 
corporate governance system that supports organizational growth and 
performance expectations, thereby increasing the firm’s probability of future 
success.  Second, linkages between measures of firm performance and the 
examined good corporate governance practices will help early-stage firms form 
structures that may signal their worthiness to investors and stakeholders, thus 
eliciting confidence and affording better access to funding to bridge the gap 
between product development and revenue generation.          
1.2. Background 
Governance of an organization defines the system under which it is 
controlled, through certain processes, structures, plans, policies, rules and 
agreements.  Thus, it can be regarded as a driver of an organization’s success, 
as its presence clarifies authority, simplifies decision–making, and ensures that 
people and organizations are accountable for their decisions (IOG, 2012). Used 
in combination with good management and good leadership, good corporate 
governance can keep the organization pointed in the right direction and 
performing strongly, creating the best value possible for its shareholders by 
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earning long term profits.  Good corporate governance principles exist to ensure 
that this occurs, protecting investors and placing Boards of Directors in an 
organizational leadership role, representing the owners and ensuring that their 
capital is directed towards the right purposes while, at the same time, acting as 
the voice of management to the owners (Brown Governance Inc., 2004).  
Corporate governance can also be defined as a collection of control 
mechanisms that are put in place to deter self-serving behaviour by increasing 
the probability of detection and shifting the risk/reward balance so that payoff 
from crime is decreased (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  A firm’s ability to control 
risks, gain access to capital and provide long term value to shareholders are 
critical contributors in the success or failure of a firm (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 
2010). 
The principal-agent model of corporate governance (or Agency Theory) is 
concerned with the problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
control of the firm.  In particular, it addresses the difficulties in motivating the 
firm’s management (the agents) to act in the best interests of the shareholders 
(the principals), rather than in their own interests (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 
2010).  Although the agents technically work for the principals, shareholders 
often cannot directly monitor their behavior, particularly when the interests of the 
parties are different.  Information asymmetry is another contributing factor to the 
agency problem; i.e., agents have access to considerably more and superior 
information than the principals (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The role of the Board of 
Directors in this model is that of a primary monitor of a firm’s agents, ensuring 
that their actions align with the best interests of its owners.  Appointed by 
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shareholders, the Board’s mandate is to run the corporation on their behalf, 
appointing, compensating, incenting, directing and removing executives with the 
goal of long term success (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010).  A gap in the 
underlying premise of the principal-agent model lies in the fact that the agents 
play a leading role in the selection of director nominees and thus, depending on 
management’s desired outcomes, the Board elected by shareholders may or 
may not be motivated to serve the shareholders’ best interests.  For this reason, 
an examination of Board structure in terms of good corporate governance 
practices is relevant.  
Linkages between governance practices and firm performance have 
been investigated by researchers and will be discussed in more detail in a later 
section.  In short, although a trend towards a positive relationship between good 
financial performance and good governance practices is evident, a clear 
relationship between poor firm performance and poor corporate governance 
practices has been documented (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Solomon, 
2010).  Identification of such a trend among Canadian LSFs listed on the TSX-
Venture Exchange (TSX-V), Canada’s junior equities market, could provide 
start-up venture companies in this industry with a framework for development of 
a governance system to support the inherent growth and organizational 
performance expectations.   
Many of the listed firms in the TSX-V Life Sciences sector are junior, 
growth-oriented companies that have evolved from a novel idea or invention 
with commercialization potential.  The TSX-V provides a marketplace with 
access to North American and global capital, allowing these early- stage firms to 
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remain on the exchange until a stable production stage accompanied by 
consistent revenue generation is reached, as depicted Figure 1 below.  At 
December 31, 2012, the Life Sciences sector of the TSX-V was comprised of 63 
issuers and maintained a quoted market value (QMV) of C$955,743,912 (TMX 
Global Leaders in Life Sciences, 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Company Growth Stage versus Capital Requirements and Listing 
Status on the TSX and TSX-V Exchange  
 
Source: http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/listing_with_us/considerations.html; January 18, 2012 
 
There is a growing perception in the financial markets that good 
corporate governance is associated with prosperous companies.  Research 
evidence indicates that corporate governance is as important for small 
companies as it is for large ones, although it may be harder to achieve 
(Solomon, 2010).  Although any TSX-V listed company must maintain a least a 
minimum level of corporate governance practices in order to meet the 
requirements of the exchange and securities regulations, implementation 
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beyond compliance may not be a key priority for these companies, whose focus 
often remains on its core science behind the product development through 
commercialization stages.   
The ultimate test of whether or not the corporate governance reform of 
the past few decades is having a positive impact on industry is establishing 
empirically whether or not there is a positive relationship between corporate 
financial performance and corporate governance (Solomon, 2010).  This study 
was designed to examine whether selected “good” corporate governance 
practices are associated with positive firm performance in junior, growth-
oriented Canadian LSFs.  Governance indicators were selected based on 
characteristics of the principal-agent model most relevant to the industry sector.  
Firm performance indicators were chosen to reflect financial and non-financial 
measures that would provide an indication to an investor of an LSF’s ability to 
control risks, gain access to capital and thus, provide long term value to 
shareholders (recalling that the ability to obtain investment to support a 
prolonged pre-commercialization phase is a necessity to the junior, growth-
oriented LSFs in Canada).  The results of this study indicate the impact of what 
are commonly perceived to be good corporate governance practices on 
performance of TSX-V listed LSFs.  They can be used as a basis for guidance 
to these firms in defining and prioritizing their governance strategies by 
providing a framework for development of a governance system to support the 
inherent growth and organizational performance expectations for the Life 




1.3. Research Question 
The central question of this research project is: 
Are good corporate governance practices associated with positive firm 
performance in publically listed Canadian growth-oriented companies in the Life 


















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Purpose and Scope of the Literature Review 
Good corporate governance practices should provide a foundation to 
support a firm’s strategic initiatives.  A firm exists to maximize shareholder 
value, be it through financial measures, societal obligations or in a configuration 
that includes environmental responsibilities known as the Triple Bottom Line.  
Regardless of a firm’s strategic focus, corporate governance, the system of 
checks and balances aimed at protecting the welfare of its shareholders and 
stakeholders, plays an important role in controlling and monitoring the firm’s 
direction and accountability.  In short, “the corporate governance framework 
should ensure that the strategic guidance of the company, effective monitoring 
of management by the Board and the Board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders,” (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  Thus, the structure and role of 
the Board of Directors may be a key factor in a firm’s success. 
The absence of good corporate governance practices has been felt in 
capital markets worldwide, causing investors to rethink the level of risk that they 
are willing to undertake.  This situation has posed a significant barrier to 
accessing capital for high-risk, growth-oriented industry sectors.  Over the past 
two decades, the wake of major corporate collusion and fraud scandals has 
spurred significant regulatory reforms that have, in turn, driven the need for 
stronger corporate controls; a significant quest for investors, firms and 
regulators alike.  This rapid rise in corporate governance reforms has been 
aimed at increasing the amount and effectiveness of monitoring and control 
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within firms and reducing the ability of executives to perpetrate self-interested 
activities to the detriment of stakeholders.  This movement has intensified public 
awareness about the power possessed by corporate executives and the 
corresponding perceived lack of power of shareholders and stakeholders. 
Researchers have sought to determine the impacts of reforms on the 
performance of publically traded firms.  Central to the issue of corporate control 
is the role of the Board of Directors; that is, which governance characteristics 
make Boards more effective and how can effectiveness best be measured? 
(Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).  This question forms the root of the following review 
of prior research and motivates the hypotheses in this study.   
In addition to the corporate controls imposed by securities commissions 
and exchanges, the Canadian Life Sciences industry is highly regulated in its 
own right, which creates a barrier to success for young firms.  Innovation in 
healthcare, agri-food and the environmental space requires that an element of 
high quality imbedded into a firm’s operations that may not necessarily be 
present in other industries.  The question then becomes whether the firm is 
willing and able to transfer its operational quality standards into the corporation’s 
business practices and governance structures and, if so, to what degree. In an 
attempt to examine this question, this research study seeks to add to the current 
body of literature by investigating the impact of several good corporate 
governance practices on firm performance under the unique conditions 




2.2. Review of Prior Research  
2.2.1. Good Corporate Governance as an Industry Competitive Advantage 
The Canadian Life Sciences industry is a valuable contributor to 
economic and technological growth in both international and domestic markets. 
Researchers, developers and manufacturers of diagnostics, pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices aim at improving societal goals through advancement of 
quality, access and usability of food, healthcare and environmental protection 
measures (Government of Canada, 2012; Chataway, Tait, & Wield, 2006).  
Challenges facing early-stage life sciences firms are great, with a constant need 
for capital accompanied by the growing shift to offshoring of research activities 
beginning to affect the industry’s competitive landscape topping the list (PWC & 
BIOTECanada, 2011).     
Particularly true to the early-stage firms listed on the TSX-V exchange is 
a deep need for continuous financing to surpass the extremely demanding 
regulatory systems, with very high costs, significant risks and long delays 
requiring many years and millions of dollars to gain approval to market their 
products and to support ongoing innovation and rapid commercialization 
(Chataway, Tait, & Wield, 2006).  Of the 119 life sciences companies listed on 
the TSX and TSX-V exchanges at the end of 2012, more than half are listed on 
the Venture Exchange, providing investors with a source of both risk and 
opportunity (TMX Global Leaders in Life Sciences, 2012).  Competition for 
funding is high within this industry sector, particularly since today’s capital 
markets are more cautious than ever in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial 
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crisis, creating barriers to access to capital, particularly for high-risk firms 
(Webster, Yatscoff, & Smythe, 2012).  Many biotechnology companies are 
currently undervalued due to their dependence on the development of one 
technology (a binary event that could lead to a large win or loss) and investor 
fatigue as they tire of awaiting expected returns, causing their support to 
evaporate and stock price to drop. On the other hand, the need for new 
products and technologies to enhance societal goals, diversification of 
investments to mitigate risk, and the potential for high returns in therapeutic or 
diagnostic arenas that are “en vogue” are leading reasons for investment into 
Life Sciences (Webster, Yatscoff, & Smythe, 2012).  Thus, high competition for 
capital is driving firms to align their priorities with securing funding which may 
place limitations on innovation, a key fundamental attribute responsible for the 
firm’s existence.  For example, PWC & BIOTECanada’s 2011 survey found that, 
among those not yet earning revenues in the Life Sciences sector, 25% 
believed that it would take greater than five years for their companies to earn 
revenues.  For those who did not have products for sale, 73% did not expect to 
have any for at least two more years, and only one-third of the surveyed 
companies were profitable, with one-half of those generating $5 million or less. 
Fifty-four percent of respondents were seeking funding at the time of the survey, 
with an additional 33% expecting to be seeking funding within the next two 
years to support long term growth activities (PWC & BIOTECanada, 2011). 
Thus, the better is the ability of a firm to position itself in a positive light in the 
eyes of the investment community, the higher are its chances for success in 
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accessing the capital required to achieve its milestones en route to long-term 
prosperity.  
Despite these challenges, industry continues the drive towards feeding 
the growing demands for better healthcare, better resource management and 
greater agricultural innovation and animal health; bringing life-improving 
products to market on both domestic and international forums (PWC & 
BIOTECanada, 2011). To accomplish this, small life sciences companies 
generally aim for one of two outcomes.  First, firms may aim to achieve success 
in their own right by surpassing industry hurdles through internal or outsourced 
expertise and by obtaining funding through any number of capital raising 
mechanisms.  This route will allow the firm to retain control over its decisions 
and will not inhibit innovation. A second outcome is firms setting their aim to 
become attractive merger/acquisition targets for large multinational enterprises.  
This strategy restricts the firm’s innovation targets to complementary 
technologies rather than opening their playing field to potentially competing with 
these large firms due to their need for resources from the bigger players to take 
the products through the regulatory channels and then leverage their sales 
networks to reach the market (Chataway, Tait, & Wield, 2006; PWC & 
BIOTECanada, 2011).  Indeed, ninety percent of PWC & BIOTECanada 
(2011)’s survey respondents listed being acquired or participating in a merger 
as one of the top three most likely scenarios for a successful Life Sciences 
business; seventy percent believed that licensing or selling IP or co-
development/partnership to fill the large firm’s product pipelines is also a likely 
option. To achieve either success outcome, the company’s structures, risks, 
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performance and future potential must be apparent and desirable to investor, 
whether it is a multinational firm or an individual investor.      
Investors look for some key indicators within firms in an attempt to predict 
the future.  Those firms that can exhibit the desired structures will gain a 
competitive advantage in the eyes of the investor and thus display a higher 
probability for future success.  Deloitte & Thompson Reuters (2011) suggest 
that strong industry indicators require greater emphasis on commercializing 
more products of greater value at less cost.  Thus, revenue, R&D cost, R&D 
cycle times, late stage success rates, and gross profit margin are good 
indicators of firm performance.  Research analysts suggest that financiers 
should seek investment into LSFs that have achieved one or more of the 
following: (1) products that have a unique mechanism of action; (2) proprietary 
ownership of technologies or processes; (3) revenue increases by product and 
sales growth year over year; (4) late-stage clinical assets (such as phase 1, 2 
and 3 clinical data); (5) a robust late-stage product pipeline; (6) multiple levers 
that drive earnings growth; (7) good partnering position and market opportunity; 
(8) strong risk profile versus opportunity; (9) market readiness; (10) robust 
manufacturing capability; (11) strong performance in comparison to competitors; 
(12) regulatory success; (13) products related to “hot” topics such as cancer and 
HIV; and/or (13) a solid leadership team with strong management of the firm’s 
business aspects (Life Sciences Report, 2012; Mack, 2012).   
In addition to industry-focused, non-financial performance indicators, 
investors must also consider financial measures in determining where to place 
their resources.  This need forms the basis for the indicators of firm performance 
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selected for this study.  In particular, this study seeks evidence that the 
presence of selected corporate governance processes and/or structures predict 
a higher potential for firm performance and thus, their presence would provide a 
competitive advantage to the firm in the view of a potential investor. 
2.2.2. Firm Performance Indicators: an Overview 
In prior research, LSF firm performance has been evaluated using a 
balance of financial and non-financial indicators various measures.  Financial 
measures including stock market performance, insider ownership, revenue, 
EBITDA and EPS, balance sheet analysis (short term liquidity, debt to equity, 
interest coverage, revenue growth, EBIDTA growth, EPS growth), return on 
capital (ROA, ROE) and valuation (P/E, P/book) have been considered (TMX 
Equicom, 2010). However, as noted above, the junior companies in this industry 
sector are often in the pre-commercialization lifecycle stages, requiring 
significant funds but not yet earning profits, or revenue in some cases. 
Therefore, performance measures for this study were chosen to accommodate 
these firms’ financial state and with consideration of risk faced by, and 
expectations of, a potential investor.  
This study investigates whether the presence of four corporate 
governance characteristics that have been selected for their relevance to the 
Life Sciences industry sector are associated with six measures of firm 
performance.  Measures of the dependent variables are based on the metrics of 
firm performance used in prior literature.  Indicators such as debt financing costs 
and yield spreads (Anderson, Manos, & Reeb, 2004), financial distress (Elloumi 
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& Gueyie, 2001), Tobin’s Q (Belkir, 2004), ROA (Bonna, Yoshikawab, & Phan, 
2004), and market value (Vafeas, 1999) have been used in previous studies.  
Cumulatively, the results of prior studies indicate that there a positive 
association between good corporate governance practice and good firm 
performance; however, the basis for this relationship cannot yet be clearly 
defined (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Solomon, 2010).  Consequently, it 
has alternatively been suggested that a more holistic approach to examining 
Board effectiveness, with consideration of organizational behavior literature 
linking team composition, tasks and roles to firm performance could be a more 
effective model for investigation (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007).  Further, it has 
been argued that, due the complexity of dynamic corporate governance 
systems, it may be difficult to assess the impact of single element of good 
governance on firm performance (Larcker & Tayan, 2011), thus indicating that 
an indexed approach might be more revealing (Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 
2010; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).       
2.2.2.1 Non-Financial Firm Performance Indicators 
Intellectual Property Ownership  
The breakthrough innovations achieved in the Life Sciences sector are 
important to Canadians and attractive to investors; they serve as a primer for 
the formation of start-up companies based on novel technologies.  This situation 
drives the need for strong intellectual property protection which can enhance a 
firm’s competitive advantage threefold.  First, the firm can use the intellectual 
property to build products and generate revenue.  Second, it can prevent others 
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from making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing the invention for a 
number of years from the date of filing.  Third, it can license the intellectual 
property to other firms and monetize the value that, without patent protection, 
would not exist (Chataway, Tait, & Wield, 2006; Singleton, 2013; Pelletier, 
2007). Thus, a firm’s ownership of intellectual property can create a valuable 
asset that significantly improves its ability to generate revenue (Pelletier, 2007), 
an attractive characteristic to financial investors.  
Major Regulatory Approval  
Life Sciences products are highly regulated, so a major regulatory 
approval is indicative of the quality (i.e., the safety and effectiveness) of the 
product, a major input into the firm’s value stream.  In this study, a major 
regulatory approval was classified as one received from one or more of the 
world’s most stringent regulatory authorities: those in Canada, the United 
States, and/or the European Union.  Approval is defined as “approval to market” 
and thus, is a preliminary step to commercialization and validation of the 
product’s efficacy.  The presence of a major regulatory approval is an indicator 
to the investor of the target market and commercialization potential of a Life 
Sciences product, technology, or service.    
2.2.2.2.  Financial Firm Performance Indicators    
Firm Value – Market-to-Book Ratio 
The market-to-book ratio is a measure of the relative value of a company 
on its balance sheet as compared to its stock price (or market value).  This is a 
useful measure to investors as it allows them to judge whether a company is 
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under or over-valued.  A low market-to-book ratio signifies that the firm may be 
a prime investment opportunity.  It may also signify that something is 
fundamentally wrong with the company (Investopedia, 2013).   Ideally, a return 
on equity, investment, or assets ratio would have been used to compare how 
well each firm’s assets were being used to generate earnings growth.  However, 
due to the fact that most of the TSX-V LFSs are not yet profitable, these 
measures were not deemed appropriate. (Return on assets (ROA) was 
evaluated (below) to determine the validity of this supposition). As a result, the 
market-to-book measure was chosen as a proxy to compare firm value across 
the industry.  
Operating Performance – Solvency   
 The cash debt coverage ratio is a measure of a firm’s solvency. This ratio 
measures the company’s ability to repay its liabilities using cash generated from 
operating activities, i.e., without having to liquidate its assets.  A strong cash 
debt coverage ratio indicates to investors the company’s ability to cover its total 
debt with its yearly cash flow from operations.  As discussed above, the TSX-V’s 
junior LSFs often require significant funding for many years to support pre-
commercialization activities prior to achievement of earnings.  Thus, the status 
of a firm’s solvency is a useful measure for comparison of firm performance 
across the industry sector.  
Operating Performance - Leverage 
The debt ratio is a measure of the ratio of total debt to total assets of the 
firm, providing potential investors with an estimation of the level of risk 
21 
 
associated with investment into that firm.  A high debt ratio indicates that the 
firm is highly leveraged, creating a much higher risk that creditors could begin to 
demand repayment of debts.  A high debt ratio may also impair the firm’s 
borrowing capacity and financial flexibility to fund capital investment and further 
its growth strategies, a high risk to the firm’s operation.  The cost of debt 
financing has been shown to inversely relate to Board independence and size 
(Anderson, Manos, & Reeb, 2004).  The level of risk relative to expected returns 
is a particularly important factor that would be considered prior to investment 
into early-stage LSFs, particularly in light of the fact high debt ratios (greater 
than one) are present in some junior Canadian LSF firms with liabilities being 
greater than assets to fund operations, resulting in negative retained earnings. 
Profitability – Return on Assets 
 A common proxy used to measure operating performance, Return on 
Assets (ROA) is a basic measure of a firm’s performance showing profits 
earned per asset dollar.  ROA indicates to investors how efficiently management 
is using its assets to generate earnings.  ROA is highly industry dependent and 
thus, useful for comparing the performance of firms within an industry 
(Investopedia, 2013).  However, due to the fact that most of the firms in the 
industry sector under investigation are not yet generating profits, ROA was 
negative for many of the firms investigated, indicating that this measure may not 
be appropriate for this study. A negative ROA indicates that the company is 
investing a high amount of capital into its production but receiving no income 
(operating at a net loss); a common characteristic of a junior LSF. This measure 
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was investigated, however, in order to determine whether ROA was an 
appropriate measure for this study.     
2.2.3. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Corporate governance can be defined as, “the economic, legal and 
institutional framework in which the corporate control and cash flow rights are 
distributed among shareholders, managers and other stakeholders of the 
company” (Eun, Resnick, & Brean, 2008).  In short, corporate governance exists 
to address the agency problem (Brown Goverance, 2004) where there is a 
separation of ownership and control between the three parties in corporations – 
shareholders, Boards of Directors and executives (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 
2010).  In this triad, shareholders must rely on Boards of Directors to act as 
governors and communicators with management.  However, despite the ability 
of directors to hire and fire the CEO, it is arguable that the bulk of the power has 
traditionally remained with management as investors have historically been 
dispersed, passive and Boards have often lacked independence, time and 
vested interested to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities (Kim, Nofsinger, & 
Mohr, 2010).  Although the impact of good corporate governance practices has 
not been consistently linked to good firm performance in prior research, it has 
been shown that investors are willing to pay more for a corporation’s stock if the 
firm demonstrates good governance.  This is based on the belief that good use 
of governance structures is strategic and it will result in better firm performance 
in the long run, reducing the risk that the company will get into trouble 
(Wheelan, Hunger, & Wicks, 2005).  In essence, the belief that governance best 
practices lead to superior firm performance is widespread, but consistent proof 
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of this theory remains elusive (Young, 2003).  Combining good management 
and good leadership to create good corporate governance structures and 
practices should keep the organization pointed in the right direction and 
performing strongly (Davis, 2007), allowing it to deliver the best value possible 
for its shareholders by creating an environment conducive to earning long term 
profits (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010).  Thus, if linkages between good 
corporate governance practices and good firm performance could be identified 
within a specific industry, then not only would investors gain access to a 
potentially predictive tool to assist in determining where to invest, but firms 
would also gain through understanding which corporate structures are 
necessary to support their quest for strong performance and to win an edge in 
the highly competitive race for capital investment.  
There is a growing perception in the financial markets that good 
corporate governance is associated with prosperous companies and that good 
corporate governance practices are just as important for small firms are they are 
to large ones (Solomon, 2010).  Core, Holthausen & Larcker (1999) found that 
firms with weaker governance structures had greater agency problems and that 
firms with greater agency problems performed worse than those that did not.  
Thus, prior research indicates that there is evidence to date that corporate 
governance practices, or lack thereof, have the potential to significantly impact a 
firm’s value to its shareholders (Solomon, 2010).  However, prior research has 
been unable to consistently identify exactly which governance practices will 
consistently elicit positive or negative effects on the performance of the firm 
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(Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 2010).  Thus, this subject remains of continued 
interest to both scholars and practitioners.   
Prior research has also linked corporate governance to firm performance 
using varying compositions of indices and measures.  Inconsistencies in single-
variable governance analyses have been suggested to be limited by the focus of 
the research design on only one dimension when the interaction effects among 
variables are possible and even probable (Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 2010).  
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)’s well-cited GIM index measured twenty-four 
corporate governance characteristics compiled by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC).  Gompers et al. (2003) concluded that good 
governance, according to their index, had a positive impact on firm 
performance, realizing higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth and 
lower capital expenditures.  Weak shareholder rights were shown to associate 
with poor firm performance in the same study (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). 
Brown & Caylor (2004) used an index based on the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) data to evaluate fifty-one factors from eight corporate 
governance categories in over more than 2000 firms.  They found that better-
governed firms are relatively more profitable, more valuable and pay out more 
cash to shareholders and vice versa.  Also identified in their study were factors 
representing good governance (such as absence of a staggered Board and 
absence of a poison pill) that were shown to be associated with bad firm 
performance (Brown & Caylor, 2004).  Despite these findings, a satisfactory 
establishment of a robust relationship between governance indices and firm 
performance has not yet been established, leading some governance scholars 
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to believe that the critical determinants of good corporate governance lie within 
specific Board characteristics due to its pivotal role as the decision-maker for 
the firm (Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 2010). 
Industry effects of corporate governance practices have been identified in 
prior research.  Giroud and Mueller (2011) found that firms with weak 
governance structures produced lower equity returns, worse operating 
performance and lower firm value, but only in non-competitive industries, where 
lower labour productivity, higher input costs and more “value-destroying 
acquisitions” were identified as the causes of the inefficiencies. The same 
effects were not evident in competitive industries driven towards maximizing 
profits through advantages gained in reducing inefficiencies (Giroud & Mueller, 
2011).  In a 2006 IMF working paper, De Nicolo, Laevena & Ueda provide 
evidence that the impact of improvements in corporate governance quality on 
traditional measures of real economic activity are positive and significant, 
particularly in industries that are dependent on external financing, such as the 
Life Sciences industry.  Similarly to Giroud and Mueller (2011), the De Nicolo et 
al. (2006), found that well-governed firms provided better managerial incentives 
that were likely to promote growth and productivity and thus strong firm 
performance which, in turn, allowed them to attract outside financing (De Nicolo, 
Laeven, & Ueda, 2006).  
Specific good governance indicators were selected for this study to 
portray characteristics representative of TSX-Venture LSFs.  Of particular 
interest to this industry is the premise that the Life Science industry is highly 
regulated in terms of products and quality which should, but often doesn’t, 
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translate into quality in the “business” side of the company. Junior companies 
led by scientists and inventors may focus more on chasing innovation than on 
good governance, employing principles only to achieve the bare minimum of 
compliance.  Thus, the structure of the Board may be representative of the 
firm’s ability to perform under management with its primary focus on science 
and innovation.     
2.2.4. Corporate Governance Indicators  
 The principal-agent model of corporate governance suggests a number 
of control mechanisms to mitigate the problems associated with the separation 
of ownership and control within a firm.  In this study, good corporate governance 
practices were considered in relation to the industry under investigation and 
used as a basis selecting the governance indicators to be evaluated. Central to 
Agency Theory is the role of the Board of Directors in overseeing the firm.   
2.2.4.1. Governance Indicators - Board Structure 
Changes to the structure of Boards of Directors were among the major 
themes in corporate governance reform over the past decade due to the critical 
nature of its monitoring and oversight roles (Young, 2003). The impact of Board 
structure and its role as a control and monitoring mechanism on firm 
performance has been investigated at great length throughout the literature.  Of 
the numerous studies conducted examining the impact of Board composition on 
performance, no consistent linkages have become apparent (Bhagat, Bolton, & 
Romano, 2010; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999), and individual findings 
have varied. In its decision-making role, the composition of the Board of 
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Directors has been noted to affect the resource allocation process, a critical 
factor affecting growth in junior LSFs.  Three structural corporate governance 
characteristics have been selected for investigation in this study based on 
linkages identified in the literature along with their particular relevance to the 
Canadian Life Sciences Industry: Board independence, CEO duality and Board 
diversity.     
Board Independence 
This study hypothesizes that, in the case of the junior TSX-V LSFs, 
Board independence will have no effect on firm performance.  Theoretically, 
independent (or outside) directors are expected to perform their duties without 
the influence of management, particularly the CEO, and, as such, have been 
considered better suited to serve as monitors against self-interested activities 
than inside directors (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010).  
The accompanying prevailing belief says that inside directors lack objectivity 
and independence from management (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001).  Investors 
consider outside directors to be the critical corporate governance mechanism for 
monitoring managers, but no decisive linkage has been found that relates 
director independence to firm performance using either accounting measures or 
stock returns (Bhagat, Bolton, & Romano, 2010).  Larcker and Tayan (2011) 
agree, indicating that most studies fail to find a significant relationship between 
formal Board independence and improved corporate outcomes.  Brown and 
Caylor (2006) further note that Board control by more than fifty percent 
independent, outside directors was unrelated to firm value.  This is likely to hold 
true for LSFs due to their small size and the interrelationships among 
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constituents, clouding true director independence.  For example, Kim et al. 
(2010) note that it may be very difficult to find directors that are entirely and 
unambiguously independent of the firm’s management, particularly among 
industry experts.  They state that independence is not a black and white issue, 
but varying shades of grey (Kim, Nofsinger, & Mohr, 2010).  Also true of the Life 
Sciences industry is the need for decision-makers to have access to adequate 
information about the firm’s technology and operations in order to form 
strategies and allocate resources destined to enhance innovation and drive firm 
growth; a job better performed by inside directors with intimate knowledge about 
the inner workings of the firm, a contrary supposition to traditional good 
governance practices (Lacetera, 2001).   
Brown & Caylor (2004) find that firms with independent boards have 
higher returns on equity, higher profit margins, larger dividend yields and larger 
stock purchases but lower Tobin’s Q, suggesting that Board independence is 
associated with some important measures of firm performance.  Rosenstein & 
Wyatt (1990) indicate that the stock market reaction to the public announcement 
of outside directors results in a stock price increase, thus showing that higher 
value to shareholders can be achieved. Elloumi & Gueyie (2001) note that the 
market itself provides incentives for outside directors to monitor management, 
while Bhagat and Bolton (2008) argue that Board members with appropriate 
levels of stock ownership will have the incentive to provide effective monitoring 
and oversight of corporate board decisions.  Thus, Board independence or 
ownership can be used as a proxy for good governance. Indeed, Rouf (2011) 
finds a positive significant relationship between Board independence and both 
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return on assets and return on equity.  The composition of the Board of 
Directors has been linked with financial distress, with healthier firms having a 
higher proportion of outsiders on their boards and more audit committees 
comprised of only outsiders (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001).   
Increasing independence of the Board can arguably extend a firm’s 
network of contacts and external sources of knowledge, allowing the firm to 
enhance its performance by, for example, directly impacting the ability of the 
Board to secure sources of funding through its higher number of external 
contacts; a very important factor in junior Canadian LSFs (Murphy & McIntyre, 
2007).  In sum, research has shown that investors generally look favourably on 
a firm’s addition of outside directors to the Board, but the true effectiveness of 
this action is not clear, since an individual’s true independence can be blurred 
by tenure and his/her true interests (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).   Further, the role 
of outsiders on the Board has been questioned based on concerns that outside 
Board members often lack sufficient knowledge, involvement, and enthusiasm 
to provide beneficial guidance to management of the firm (Wheelan, Hunger, & 
Wicks, 2005; Larcker & Tayan, 2011).   
  The TSX Venture exchange requires only that the Board contains two 
independent directors and not a majority, as is required by securities regulations 
in most developed countries including the main TSX Board and the United 
States Stock Exchanges.  In light of the mixed findings regarding the impact of 
Board of Directors independence on firm performance in the literature and 
considering the relatively small scale of the industry sector under investigation, it 
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was hypothesized that no significant association between Board independence 
and firm performance would be identified within this study.        
H1:  Board independence has no effect on firm performance in 
junior Canadian Life Sciences firms.   
CEO Duality 
A second characteristic of Board structure is whether the firm has dual 
leadership, i.e., the CEO and Chairman of the Board is the same person.  Such 
duality is generally considered to be less desirable than separation of the CEO 
and Chairman’s roles (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007; Yermack, 1996).  It has been 
expressed frequently in the governance literature that agency problems are 
more likely to occur when the same person holds both the CEO and Chairman 
of the Board positions and that separation of these roles has become a 
governance best practice, ensuring a balance of power and authority at the top 
of the firm (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Solomon, 2010) and “entrenching a check at 
the heart of their corporate governance systems” (Solomon, 2010).  In contrast 
to this theory, this study hypothesizes that CEO/Chairman duality will be 
positively associated with firm performance due to the leadership required for 
LSFs’ success.  Early stage science-based firms are often led by the founder or 
inventor of the novel innovation upon which the company was built.  In these 
cases, s/he is likely to be motivated towards long term growth and success of 
the firm and thus aligned with shareholder values in his/her decisions.  Duality, 
under such circumstances, maybe beneficial in that greater “unfettered” control 
of the decision-making process is held by one individual who presumably holds 
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a long run view rather than two individuals with potentially opposing viewpoints.  
Further, the integration of scientific knowledge into these firms’ strategies and 
processes should go beyond legal boundaries and become a foundational 
element in their corporate governance practices, particularly in the decision-
making process (Lacetera, 2001).  Thus, it is argued that agency problems 
should have minimal impact via CEO/Chairman duality in this industry sector 
and that firm performance would be enhanced by the CEO and Chairman roles 
being held by a single individual.   
However, Larker and Tayan (2011) indicate that splitting the Chairman 
and CEO roles is gaining widespread support as a best corporate governance 
practice for public companies.  The benefits of the distinction lie in the following: 
a clearer separation of responsibility between the Board and management; 
elimination of conflicts in terms of evaluation, compensation and succession 
planning surrounding the CEO; allocation of a clear authority position to one 
Director in the eyes of shareholders, management and the public; and 
allowance for the CEO of more time to focus on strategy, operations and 
company culture (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). The drawbacks in the separation of 
the Chairman and CEO roles may include an artificial nature of such separation, 
making recruiting a CEO difficult when one expects to hold both titles; creating 
duplication of leadership and internal confusion, leading to inefficient decision-
making through shared leadership; creating an information gap between the 
Chairman and CEO; and weakening leadership during a crisis (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2011).  Brown and Caylor (2004) tested the effects of CEO duality on 
firm performance, showing that firms had higher market valuation when the 
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CEO and Board Chairman positions were separate.  Rouf (2011) found that a 
positive significant relationship existed between role separation and both return 
on assets and return on equity.  Bhagat and Bolton (2008) contributed to the 
literature through their finding that separation of the CEO and Chairman roles in 
a firm were significantly positively correlated with firm operating performance.  
Elloumi & Gueyie (2001) did not document any differences between financially 
distressed and healthy firms with respect to CEO/Chair duality in the Board 
structure.  Belkhir (2004) found that CEOs with long tenure were more likely to 
hold a dual CEO/Chairman role, while Larker and Tayan (2011) noted that most 
studies found little or no evidence that separation of the Chairman and CEO 
roles led to improved firm performance outcomes.  They concluded that it might 
not make sense to separate the CEO and Chairman roles without considering 
who the CEO is as well as the structural, cultural, and governance features of 
the company.      
H2 – CEO Duality is positively associated with firm performance in the 
Canadian Life Sciences’ industry’s junior firms. 
Board Diversity 
The third structural characteristic investigated in this study is the 
composition of Board of Directors in terms of diversity.  Recently, Boards have 
been coming under scrutiny as a number of studies suggested that diversity 
makes a difference in the performance of a firm due to the fact that a company’s 
success depends on its ability to “understand, serve and conduct business with 
an increasingly diverse population,” (Ernst & Young, 2012; Scott, 2012).  This 
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study predicts that diversity in the boardroom, as measured by the percentage 
of female directors, is positively associated with firm performance in the Life 
Sciences industry sector.   
Female directors generally are underrepresented on corporate Boards, 
holding few corporate Board seats and displaying a significantly varied profile 
from their male counterparts with more directorships, shorter tenure, lower age, 
higher tendency towards being independent and higher likelihood of being 
retired from their main occupation (Ferreira, 2010).  These differences indicate 
that, in general, including a female director may increase Board diversity in 
other categories as well.  Board diversity has been noted to promote better 
decision-making as it allows access to a wide range of perspectives and 
minimizes the potential for “groupthink”, i.e., a quick and sometimes biased 
decision due to similarities in intentions and viewpoints within the group (Larcker 
& Tayan, 2011).  Diversity in terms of gender, ethnicity and competency, 
particularly in relation to finance, technology and risk management are 
becoming more and more valuable to shareholders who are pressing for a 
broad range of perspectives, backgrounds and skills in corporate management 
and governance roles (Ernst & Young, 2012). Boards also may benefit from 
diverse sets of expertise, skills sets, age, and tenure (Murphy & McIntyre, 
2007). In attaining diversity, however, a firm must be careful, since allowing the 
Board to become too large and cumbersome is likely to hinder efficient 
coordination and the meaningful involvement of each Board member (Murphy & 
McIntyre, 2007).   
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A significant positive relationship has been identified between the 
proportion of women and minorities on the Board and the firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003).  Carter et al. (2003) 
also found that the fraction of women and minorities directors decreases as the 
number of insider directors increases.  However, some research suggests that 
diversity in the Boardroom may detract from quality decision-making due to less 
and lower quality of information sharing, higher conflict, and lack of common 
goals in heterogeneous groups (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  Further to their 2003 
work, Carter et al. (2010) did not find a significant association between the 
number of women or ethnic minority directors on the Board and firm financial 
performance. They suggested that gender and ethnic diversity may have a 
contingent positive, negative, or neutral effect on firm performance under 
different circumstances at different periods of time.  They concluded that Board 
appointments of women and ethnic minorities should be based on criteria other 
than expectations for firm financial performance (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010).  Finally, there is a risk that attempts of a firm to gender-balance 
the Board could result in “tokenism” by recruiting under-qualified directors 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011).          
In the context of the Life Sciences Industry, the role of Boards in strategic 
decision making is critical and, as such, should be set up to optimize a 
combination of the elements of business and science, allowing it to take a 
proactive view and an integrated approach to management of the firm.  
According to Ernst and Young (2012), “Boards that  lack a breadth of diversity 
across gender, ethnicity, age, geography and experience and that are not 
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challenging their composition and effectively conducting board assessment and 
development strategies, risk becoming under-performing boards6 and may lack 
the diversity and dynamism required to compete in today’s global markets”.  
Thus, a heterogeneous set of directors may support enhanced shareholder 
value. Therefore, it is expected that there is a positive association between 
Board diversity and firm performance. 
H3 – Board diversity is positively associated with firm performance in 
junior Canadian Life Sciences firms.  
2.2.4.2. Governance Indicators – Director Equity Ownership  
Director Equity Ownership 
This study hypothesizes that higher equity ownership of directors is 
positively associated with the selected measures of firm performance because 
high share ownership can align the interests of directors with shareholders with 
a view to the long term. This expectation is based on a premise that corporate 
governance issues tend to arise when ownership and control are separated 
(McConnell, McKeon, & Xu, 2010). 
Governance of Canadian public firms has been characterized, in contrast 
to United States firms, with the prevalence of large block or controlling 
shareholders, such as extended families (such as the Westons, Thompsons, 
Beaudoins, Irvings, Aspers or McCains)  who control firms through pyramiding 
or dual-class shares;  a system long-abandoned in the United States (Eun, 
Resnick, & Brean, 2008).  Although this model is beginning to change in 
Canada, in the face of recent governance reforms and activist shareholder 
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activities, strong family ownerships have historically not traded shares or 
retained control through ownership of traded shares, potentially extracting 
private benefits from control (Eun, Resnick, & Brean, 2008).  In the junior Life 
Sciences sector, founders and/or technology inventors often display similar 
control attributes.  Founders and inventors in many cases will maintain a large 
equity ownership stake in the firm and thus, control of the firm, which 
theoretically would force decisions that will drive strong firm performance in the 
long term.  Nonetheless, it is possible that centralized control in a firm’s 
ownership structure could create governance problems with the interests of 
public shareholders being contrary to those of the controlling shareholders 
and/or managers of the firm.  Canada’s relatively small market for board 
members, particularly with expertise that translates into the Life Sciences 
sector, and relatively few institutional investors in comparison to the United 
States, further contributes to the potential for this problem (Scott, 2012).  
 On the question of whether equity ownership by directors increases 
operating performance or firm value, the results in the literature are mixed.   
Equity ownership by directors should minimize self-interested behaviours and 
create greater incentive to engage in activities that create long-term value for 
the firm.  Thus, low inside share ownership can contribute to greater agency 
problems (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  While Boards with heavy share ownership 
are considered to be less independent (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007), stock 
ownership by Board members has been shown to increase the value of firms, 
through its significant positive association with firm operating performance 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). However, these results only hold at low levels of equity 
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ownership because larger ownership positions (5% to 25%) may allow for 
management entrenchment and weakened oversight (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).  
Brown and Caylor (2004) found no evidence that operating performance or firm 
valuation were positively related to directors receiving all or some of their fees in 
equity, but noted in later studies that value is significantly higher in firms with 
stock ownership guidelines for directors (Brown & Caylor, 2006).  Bhagat et al. 
(2010) note in their review article that studies that calculate ownership as the 
percentage of shares owned by outside directors did not show a significant 
association between ownership and firm performance.  Elloumi & Gueyie (2001) 
showed that outside director’s ownership and directorship affected the likelihood 
of financial distress in a sample of Canadian firms by showing that Boards of 
financially distressed firms had significantly fewer outsider members and were 
less likely to have blockholders who were not affiliated with management 
holding more than 20% of the outstanding shares as compared to financially 
healthy firms.  Belkhir (2004) found a significant inverse relationship between 
Board structures and ownership, where higher equity ownership by managers 
and directors tended towards lower proportions of outside directors.  Even 
though both of these characteristics (high equity ownership and proportion of 
outside Directors) are aimed at reducing agency conflict, Belkhir (2004) showed 
that smaller insider ownership was associated with better performance, but 
causality may not be established by this results since poor firm performance 
may lead insiders to reduce their equity ownership holdings (Belkir, 2004). 
H4: High equity ownership by directors is positively associated with firm 
performance in junior Canadian Life Sciences firms. 
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In conclusion, both theory and prior research indicate that good corporate 
governance can create value for a firm’s shareholders, but the exact channels 
remain undefined (Kadyrzhanova & Rhodes-Kropf, 2011).  Prior research shows 
that there is not yet a well-established consensus regarding the impact of good 
corporate governance processes and Board structures on firm performance. 
This study attempts to identify industry-specific linkages between the selected 
variables and contribute to the current body of knowledge on this topic by 
attempting to answer the research question, “Are good Corporate Governance 
practices associated with positive firm performance in publically listed Canadian 
growth-oriented companies in the Life Sciences sector?” by testing the 
individual hypotheses above.          













CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data Sources 
Data for this study (see Appendix) were obtained from publicly available 
information as at March 16, 2013 for sixty-two of the sixty-three public 
companies listed in the Life Sciences sector of TSX-Venture Exchange at 
December 31, 2012 (http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/life_sciences.html). The 
sampling period was defined by the firms’ fiscal years ended between October 
31, 2011 and December 31, 2012.  Fiscal year 2012 financial data were not yet 
published for four firms (firms 38, 43, 46, 47) with years ended in October and 
November during the sampling period. For these four firms, data from the 2011 
fiscal year-end was used.  Specifically, information was sourced from each 
company’s website, The Stock Market, Canadian Stock Exchange, TMX Group 
(www.tmx.com) under each firm’s trading symbol, and the System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) (www.sedar.com).  Specifically, the 
audited annual financial statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A), and the corresponding Management Information Circulars and Annual 
Information Forms (AIF) for the period under investigation were the primary 
sources of data, while press releases, material change reports and public 
notices obtained from SEDAR and the firms’ websites were used as secondary 
sources to fill information gaps.  No public information was available for one of 
the sixty-three companies; this firm was removed from the data set.  In four 
instances, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and thus, CEO duality was 
not possible to identify from any source. 
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3.2. Research Design 
The study was designed to test the central research question by 
examining whether firm performance is a function of its governance 
characteristics.  Firm performance, a dependent variable, was measured using 
both financial and non-financial measures.  Financial measures included the 
market-to-book ratio, cash debt coverage ratio, debt ratio, and the return on 
assets ratio.  Non-financial measures included the firm’s ownership of patents 
and approval to market its products by a major global regulator.  Corporate 
governance indicators, the independent variables, were examined using three 
structural measures of each firm’s Board of Directors: independence, CEO 
duality, diversity, and equity ownership by directors.  Control variables included 
the size of the Board of Directors, the size of the firm, the presence of a 
significant stockholder, and cross-listing of each firm on at least one other stock 
exchange.  Details regarding the study variables are listed in Tables 1 through 4 
below.  The following four hypotheses were tested using univariate linear and 
logistic regression analyses in the study. 
H1: Board independence has no effect on firm performance in junior Canadian 
Life Sciences Firms; 
H2:  CEO Duality is positively associated with firm performance in the Canadian 
Life Sciences industry’s junior firms; 
H3: Board diversity is positively associated with firm performance in junior 
Canadian Life Sciences firms; and 
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H4: High equity ownership by directors is positively associated with firm 
performance in junior Canadian Life Sciences firms.    
 




Firm Performance: Market-to-Book Ratio, Cash Debt Coverage Ratio, 





Good Corporate Governance Practices: Board Independence, CEO 
Duality, Board Diversity, and Director Equity Ownership  
 
Control Variables Board Size, Firm Size, Regulatory Regime, Presence of a Blockholder 
 
 
Dependent Variables – Firm Performance Indicators 
Six dependant variables were used in the analyses.  These variables 
were chosen as measures of firm performance. They were selected to highlight 
factors of particular interest to investors considering capital financing of firms 
listed in the Canadian Life Sciences sector on the TSX-Venture exchange.   A 
detailed description of each variable and methods of calculation are described in 









Table 2: Description of Dependent Study Variables 
Dependant Variable Description 




Firms with no major regulatory approval for their products, 
defined as an approval to market their product(s) from Canadian, 
American or European authorities were coded as 0. 
 
Firms with one or more major regulatory approval for their 
products, defined as an approval to market its product(s) from 






Firms with no ownership of patents in the time period under 
investigation were coded as 0. 
 
Firms with ownership of one or more patents in the time period 






Debt Ratio was calculated as Total Debt
1
, designated by Total 
Liabilities per Total Assets as listed in the Audited Annual 
Financial Statements issued in the time period under 
investigation. 
 




Market to Book ratio was calculated as Market Capitalization at 
the most recent year end per Total Assets
2
 as listed in the 
Audited Annual Financial Statements issued in the time period 
under investigation. 
 




Return on Assets was calculated as the Net Income per Average 
Total assets of the current and previous year as listed in the 
Audited Annual Financial Statements issued in the time period 
under investigation. 
 




Cash Debt Coverage was calculated as the ratio of Net Cash 
from Operating Activities per Average Total Liabilities of the 
current and previous year as listed in the Audited Annual 
Financial Statements issued in the time period under 
investigation  
 
Notes: 1 Total debt was defined as total liabilities; 2 Total Assets was used instead of net assets since, due to the nature 
of the firms under investigation, net assets were negative in most cases.     
 
Independent Variables – Good Corporate Governance Indicators 
 The impact of good corporate governance practices on firm performance 
was discussed in detail in the literature review.  Four corporate governance 
characteristics were selected for investigation based on linkages identified in the 
literature along with their particular relevance to the Canadian Life Sciences 
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industry.  Detailed descriptions of these variables of interest and explanations of 
calculation of these measures are listed in Table 3 below.  
Table 3: Description of Independent Study Variables 










Board independence was classified by two measures: 
1.  Percentage of Independent Directors was calculated as the number 
of independent directors, as classified according to NI 52-110 in the 
Management Information Circular for the time period under 
investigation per Board size. 
 
2. Independence Classification: 
• If a firm had less than 2 independent directors according to its 
Management Information Circular for the period in question, it was 
considered to be in non-compliance with the TSX-Venture 
exchange rules and was coded as 0 
• If a firm had only 2 independent directors according to its 
Management Information Circular for the period in question, it was 
considered to be in compliance with the TSX-Venture exchange 
rules and was coded as 1 
• If a firm had more than 2  but less than majority independent 
directors according to its Management Information Circular for the 
period in question, it was coded as 2 
• If a firm had a majority independent directors according to its 
Management Information Circular for the period in question, it was 








The presence of CEO Duality was determined by a single individual 
holding both the Chairman and CEO roles during the time period under 
investigation. This circumstance was determined by a review of various 
sources.  Firms displaying CEO Duality were coded as 0. 
 
Firms displaying separation between the Chairman and CEO roles to 








Calculated as the number of women directors on the Board per Board 
size as reported in the in the Management Information Circular for the 
time period under investigation  
 








Classified by two measures: 
1. Average equity ownership by Directors was calculated by 
dividing the total equity ownership by the Board of Directors, 
according to the Management Information Circular for the time 
period under investigation, by the size of the Board. 
 
2. Total percentage of equity ownership by the Board of Directors 
was calculated by dividing the total equity ownership by the 
Board according to the Management Information Circular for the 
time period under investigation by the total number of shares at 




Notes: 1 In 4 cases, the individual holding the Chairman’s role were not able to be identified; no data for these points was 
included in the analysis.  
2
 Board Diversity was determined using the percentage of female Directors on each firm’s 
Board. Gender was chosen as a representative measure of diversity due to its definitiveness where other measures, 




 Four control variables were used.  Control variables were selected to 
provide a constant, unchanging standard of comparison among the firms in 
order to clarify the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables.  In essence, because corporate governance quality may contribute to, 
but is not fully attributable to, differences in firm performance, control variables 
were selected to control for the variability within the dependent variables.  The 
control variables are described in Table 4 below.    
Table 4: Description of Control Variables 





Calculated as the number of Directors elected at the annual 
shareholder meeting held in 2012 according to the Management 






Calculated as the value for Total Assets listed in the Audited 







Firms listed only on the TSX-Venture exchange were coded as 0 
and firms with a listing in the United States, Europe or other 
exchange were coded as 1. 
 




Firms with no blockholder holding more than 10% of the firm's 
outstanding shares, according to the Management Information 
Circular for the time period under investigation, were coded as 0. 
 
Firms with at least one blockholder holding from 10 to 30% of 
total shares outstanding, according to the Management 
Information Circular for the time period under investigation, were 
coded as 1. 
 
Firms with at least one blockholder holding greater than 30% of 
total outstanding shares, according to the Management 
Information Circular for the time period under investigation, were 







3.3. Data Analysis Procedures    
Sample observations from the sixty-two firms in this study were first 
analyzed for descriptive statistics including mean, maximum and minimum 
values and standard deviation for the variables.  A correlation matrix was then 
created and analyzed for associations among the variables.  Data were then 
used to conduct univariate linear and logistic regression analyses of the 
dependent variables on the independent variables to determine whether 
significant associations, in any, were present, testing the predictive accuracy of 
the corporate governance indicators on firm performance.  Regression models 
were executed with and without the presence of control variables to evaluate 
whether control variables impacted the predictive ability of the independent 













CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the continuous and binary variables obtained 
from the sample observations are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
These results include mean, maximum, and minimum values along with 
standard deviation for each variable included in the sample.   
Of the four corporate governance indicators tested, the descriptive 
statistics show that the majority of the firms in the sample have implemented 
three of the four good governance practices chosen for this study. The mean 
value for the proportion of independent directors on the Board (%IND) is 66.5%; 
complimentary to the good governance practice of maintaining a majority of 
independent directors on the Board. The coding system for best practices in 
Board independence (CODEIND) supports this result with 72.6% of firms 
classified as code 3, indicating the prevalence of majority Director 
independence for firms in the sample. Separation of the Chairman and CEO 
roles was prevalent as well, with 68.4% of firms displaying this good governance 








































%IND 62 33.33% 100.00% 66.46% 15.48% 
%FEMALE 62 0% 40.00% 4.68% 8.98% 
DIRAVEQOWN 62 3987.50 9659588.50 2051327.98 2384004.05 
BODTOT%EQOWN 62 .08% 77.05% 20.67% 20.33% 
FIRMSIZE 62 19751 61586000 6398369.32 11515449.3 
MARKETCAP 62 487177.60 1.46 E8 19862088.64 27507185.6 
MARKETTOBOOK 62 .03 563.55 17.30 71.29 
TOTALDEBT 62 -13000 38385000 3644367.71 6385998.1 
ROA 62 -89.79 14.26 -3.93 12.27 
CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 62 -12.68 1.76 -2.00 2.86 
DEBTRATIO 62 -.008 65.94 3.48 11.53 
 
Total equity ownership (BODTOT%EQOWN) by the Board of Directors 
ranged widely from 0.08% to 77.05%, averaging at 20.7%.  Because equity 
ownership by directors is considered to align the Board with shareholders’ 
interests and enhance its oversight and monitoring functions, its presence can 
be considered a good corporate governance indicator.  The wide range of equity 
holdings by Directors in this category is likely due to the fact that inventors and 
founders in this industry tend towards retaining a large block of controlling 
shares, which is a distinguishing characteristic of Canadian public companies in 
general, as discussed above in the review of prior research. Also, because 
many of these firms are cash-poor, compensation containing an equity 
component may be used in lieu of monetary compensation for Directors with the 
anticipation of high returns resulting from growth of the firm.  
Fewer firms in the sample embraced diversity as measured by the 
percentage of female Directors on the Board, with only 15 of the 62 firms having 
one or more female Directors (average 4.0%, min 0%, max 40%).  It is possible 
that female directorships may not be truly representative of Board diversity in 
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this industry and that diversity in ethnicity or core competency expertise might 
be a better indicator. Under these alternative circumstances, the firms in the 
sample may also be embracing diversity, but the evidence remains outside the 
scope of this study.      
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics – Binary Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
 # in sample Proportion in sample 
(%) 
CODEIND   
0 – Noncompliance (less than 2 independent) 1 1.6 
1 – Compliance (2 independent) 8 12.9 
2 – Less than 2 but less than majority independent 8 12.9 
3 – Majority independent 45 72.6 
TOTAL 62 100.0 
   
CEODUALITY   
   
0 – Single individual holds CEO and Chairman roles 18 31.6 
1 – Roles held by different individuals 39 68.4 
TOTAL 57 100.0 
   
PATENTS   
   
0 – Does not own patents 28 45.2 
1 – Owns at least one patent 34 54.8 
TOTAL 62 100.0 
   
MAJORREGAPPROVAL   
   
0 – Does not hold a major (Can, US, EU) regulatory approval 38 61.3 
1 – Does hold a major (Can, US, EU) regulatory approval 24 38.7 
TOTAL 62 100.0 
   
REGREGIME   
   
0 – Listed only on TSX-V exchange 43 69.4 
1 – Listed on TSX-V exchange and at least one other 19 30.6 
TOTAL 62 100.0 
   
BLOCKHOLDER   
   
0 – No holder owns greater than 10% of outstanding shares 21 33.9 
1 – At least one holder owns between 10 and 30% 30 48.4 
2 – At least one holder owns greater than 30% 11 17.7 






4.2. Correlations among Study Variables 
 A correlation matrix (Table 7) using the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient was used to determine whether any significant correlations existed 
among the variables, highlighting points where significant predictive 
relationships were likely to be found and measuring the extent to which positive 
or negative correlations were present.  Sample correlations indicated that 
significant positive and negative associations existed between the independent 
variables and both the dependant and control variables at both the p<0.01 and 
p<0.05 significance levels. In terms of the associations between the 
independent and the control variables, average equity ownership by Directors 
(DIRAVEEQOWN) and total equity ownership by Directors (BODTOTEQOWN) 
were significantly positively correlated with the size of the Board of Directors 
(BODSIZE) at p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively. Total equity ownership by 
Directors was also positively correlated with the presence of a shareholder with 
greater than 10% ownership of the total outstanding shares (BLOCKHOLDER) 
at the p<0.05.  CODEIND, representative of four classifications of Board 
independence was significantly negatively correlated with the presence of a 





























































































SP EARM AN 'S B ODSIZE CORR COEFF 1 .257
* 0.155 0.033 -0.063 -0.052 -0.143 -0.066 -0.128 -0.197 0.156 0.231 0.099 0.173 .252 * .330 **
RHO SIG (2TAILED) . 0.044 0.228 0.799 0.627 0.686 0.269 0.608 0.32 0.126 0.225 0.07 0.463 0.179 0.048 0.009
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
FIRM SIZE CORR COEFF .257* 1 -0.09 0.235 0.02 0.071 -.567** -.574** .564** -0.029 0.223 0.243 -0.062 -0.112 -0.04 -0.064
SIG (2TAILED) 0.044 . 0.501 0.066 0.875 0.585 0 0 0 0.824 0.081 0.057 0.647 0.385 0.733 0.621
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
REGREGIM E CORR COEFF 0.155 -0.087 1 -0.003 -0.169 0.181 0.159 0.116 -0.196 -0.038 -0.004 0.032 -0.107 0.172 0.135 0.091
SIG (2TAILED) 0.228 0.501 . 0.98 0.189 0.158 0.216 0.368 0.126 0.769 0.976 0.802 0.429 0.182 0.296 0.482
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
B LOCKHOLDER CORR COEFF 0.033 0.235 -0 1 0.15 -0.107 -0.099 -0.215 0.228 0.222 -0.235 - .298
* -0.233 -0.029 0.195 .313 *
SIG (2TAILED) 0.799 0.066 0.98 . 0.244 0.41 0.446 0.093 0.075 0.082 0.066 0.019 0.081 0.821 0.129 0.013
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
M A JORREG CORR COEFF -0.063 0.02 -0.17 0.15 1 0.056 0.098 -0.08 0.009 0.218 -0.088 -0.157 0.097 -0.216 0.004 0.068
A P PROVA L SIG (2TAILED) 0.627 0.875 0.189 0.244 . 0.667 0.448 0.539 0.943 0.088 0.498 0.223 0.472 0.092 0.977 0.597
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
P A TENTS CORR COEFF -0.052 0.071 0.181 -0.107 0.056 1 -0.074 0.087 -0.174 -0.223 -0.116 -0.08 0.06 -0.016 0.227 0.004
SIG (2TAILED) 0.686 0.585 0.158 0.41 0.667 . 0.566 0.502 0.177 0.082 0.369 0.538 0.658 0.904 0.076 0.978
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
DEB TRATIO CORR COEFF -0.143 -.567** 0.159 -0.099 0.098 -0.074 1 .319* -.388** .501** -0.227 - .305
* 0.216 0.057 0.231 0.131
SIG (2TAILED) 0.269 0 0.216 0.446 0.448 0.566 . 0.011 0.002 0 0.076 0.016 0.107 0.658 0.071 0.312
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
M A RKETTOBOOK CORR COEFF -0.066 -.574** 0.116 -0.215 -0.08 0.087 .319* 1 -.571** -.325** -0.004 -0.004 -0.023 0.217 0.136 -0.079
SIG (2TAILED) 0.608 0 0.368 0.093 0.539 0.502 0.011 . 0 0.01 0.978 0.978 0.865 0.09 0.294 0.539
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
ROA CORR COEFF
-0.128 .564** -0.2 0.228 0.009 -0.174 -.388** -.571** 1 .342** -0.023 0.02 -.298 * - .332 ** -0.12 -0.017
SIG (2TAILED) 0.32 0 0.126 0.075 0.943 0.177 0.002 0 . 0.007 0.856 0.876 0.024 0.008 0.337 0.896
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
CA SHDEB T CORR COEFF -0.197 -0.029 -0.04 0.222 0.218 -0.223 .501** -.325** .342** 1 -0.107 -0.162 -0.142 -0.108 0.175 .288
*
COVERAGE SIG (2TAILED) 0.126 0.824 0.769 0.082 0.088 0.082 0 0.01 0.007 . 0.407 0.21 0.291 0.405 0.174 0.023
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
%IND CORR COEFF 0.156 0.223 -0 -0.235 -0.088 -0.116 -0.227 -0.004 -0.023 -0.107 1 .779** -0.04 -0.047 -0.2 -0.205
SIG (2TAILED) 0.225 0.081 0.976 0.066 0.498 0.369 0.076 0.978 0.856 0.407 . 0 0.765 0.719 0.125 0.109
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
CODEIND CORR COEFF 0.231 0.243 0.032 - .298
* -0.157 -0.08 - .305 * -0.004 0.02 -0.162 .779** 1 -0.036 0.03 -0.17 -0.118
SIG (2TAILED) 0.07 0.057 0.802 0.019 0.223 0.538 0.016 0.978 0.876 0.21 0 . 0.792 0.818 0.197 0.363
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
CEODUALITY CORR COEFF 0.099 -0.062 -0.11 -0.233 0.097 0.06 0.216 -0.023 -.298
* -0.142 -0.04 -0.036 1 0.228 -0.02 -0.174
SIG (2TAILED) 0.463 0.647 0.429 0.081 0.472 0.658 0.107 0.865 0.024 0.291 0.765 0.792 . 0.088 0.912 0.195
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
%FEM A LE CORR COEFF 0.173 -0.112 0.172 -0.029 -0.216 -0.016 0.057 0.217 -.332
** -0.108 -0.047 0.03 0.228 1 0.227 0.24
SIG (2TAILED) 0.179 0.385 0.182 0.821 0.092 0.904 0.658 0.09 0.008 0.405 0.719 0.818 0.088 . 0.076 0.061
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
DIRA VEQOWN CORR COEFF .252
* -0.044 0.135 0.195 0.004 0.227 0.231 0.136 -0.124 0.175 -0.197 -0.166 -0.015 0.227 1 .716**
SIG (2TAILED) 0.048 0.733 0.296 0.129 0.977 0.076 0.071 0.294 0.337 0.174 0.125 0.197 0.912 0.076 . 0
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
B ODTOT%OWN CORR COEFF .330
** -0.064 0.091 .313 * 0.068 0.004 0.131 -0.079 -0.017 .288 * -0.205 -0.118 -0.174 0.24 .716** 1
SIG (2TAILED) 0.009 0.621 0.482 0.013 0.597 0.978 0.312 0.539 0.896 0.023 0.109 0.363 0.195 0.061 0 .
N 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 57 62 62 62
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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In terms of the associations between the dependent and independent 
variables, a significant negative association was present between CODEIND 
and the debt ratio at the p<0.05 level.  Both the percentage of female Directors 
and CEO duality were negatively correlated with return on assets (at p<0.01 and 
p<0.05 levels, respectively).  These results indicate that, within each of the 
described relationships, as one variable increases, the other will decrease. The 
only significant positive correlation identified was between total equity ownership 
of the Board of Directors and the cash debt coverage ratio, indicating that firms 
with higher equity ownership by directors have more cash from operating 
activities (or lower average total liabilities). 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
4.3.1. Board Independence 
 Univariate linear regressions of the continuous dependent variables 
(DEBTRATIO, MARKETTOBOOK, CASHDEBTCOVERAGE and ROA) were 
performed on two measures of director independence, the percentage 
independent directors on the Board (%IND) and a coding system designed to 
classify the level of independence on the Board (CODEIND).   
%IND: 
Consistent with H1, no significant associations were identified at p<0.1 
using %IND as the independent variable with or without control variables 






Table 8:   ANOVA Results for Debt Ratio, Market to Book, Cash Debt 
Coverage and ROA on Percentage Independent Directors 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 – Debt Ratio Regression 235.265 1 235.265 1.795 .185
a
 
Residual 7862.692 60 131.045   
Total 8097.957 61    




Residual 304014.650 60 5066.911   
 Total 310002.903 61    
3 – Cash Debt Regression 16.875 1 16.875 2.106 .152
a
 
       Coverage 
Residual 480.762 60 8.013   
 Total 497.637 61    




Residual 9078.049 60 151.301   
 Total 9177.973 61    
5 – Debt Ratio Regression 801.435 5 160.287 1.230 .307
b
 
       With Controls 
Residual 7296.522 56 130.295   
 Total 8097.957 61    
6 – Market to Book Regression 14211.136 5 2842.227 .538 .747
b
 
       With Controls 
Residual 295791.767 56 5281.996   
 Total 310002.903 61    
7 – Cash Debt Regression 42.676 5 8.535 1.051 .397
b
 
       Coverage 
Residual 454.961 56 8.124   
     With Controls 
Total 497.637 61    
4– ROA Regression 307.578 5 61.516 .388 .855
b
 
      With Controls 
Residual 8870.396 56 158.400   
 Total 9177.973 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), %IND 
b.  Predictors: (Constant), BLOCKHOLDER, REGREGIME, BODSIZE, %IND, FIRMSIZE 
 
 Logistic regression was used to regress the binary dependent variables 
MAJORREGAPPROVAL and PATENT (representing firm ownership of at least 
one major regulatory approval and at least one patent, respectively) on %IND. 
No significant associations were identified with or without inclusion of the control 
variables in the model, which is consistent with H1 (Tables 9 and 10).      
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Table 9: Model Summary for Major Regulatory Approval and Patents on 
Percentage of Independent Directors 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 - MAJORREGAPPROVAL 82.314 .007 .010 
2- PATENT 84.853 .008 .011 
 
Table 10:  Coefficients with Major Regulatory Approval and Patents on 
Percentage of Independent Directors  





IND -1.137 1.705 .445 1 .505 .321 




IND -.950 1.921 .244 1 .621 .387 
 MAJORREGAPPROVAL 
BODSIZE -.023 .250 .009 1 .926 .977 
 With controls 
FIRMSIZE .000 .000 .052 1 .820 1.000 
 
REGREGIME(1) .759 .634 1.433 1 .231 2.136 
 
BLOCKHOLDER   3.164 2 .206  
 
BLOCKHOLDER(1) -.572 .906 .398 1 .528 .565 
 
BLOCKHOLDER(2) .553 .807 .470 1 .493 1.739 
 
Constant -.315 1.784 .031 1 .860 .730 
  3
 a
   
IND -1.200 1.680 .511 1 .475 .301 
  PATENT 
Constant .994 1.150 .746 1 .388 2.701 
  4
 b
   
BODSIZE -.115 .244 .222 1 .637 .891 
  PATENT 
FIRMSIZE .000 .000 .097 1 .756 1.000 
  With Controls 
REGREGIME(1) -1.002 .625 2.572 1 .109 .367 
 
BLOCKHOLDER   2.265 2 .322  
 
BLOCKHOLDER(1) 1.134 .895 1.606 1 .205 3.109 
 
BLOCKHOLDER(2) 1.269 .850 2.227 1 .136 3.556 
 
IND -1.949 1.935 1.014 1 .314 .142 
 
Constant 1.890 1.798 1.105 1 .293 6.618 
 a. Variable(s) entered: IND. 
b. Variable(s) entered 1: IND, BODSIZE, FIRMSIZE, REGREGIME, and BLOCKHOLDER. 
 
 Results of the univariate and logistic regression analyses of the 
dependent variables on the percentage of independent directors on the Board 
were consistent with H1 which suggested that percentage of independent 
directors on the Board was not associated with firm performance.  Although 
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many investors view majority of independent directors on the Board as a critical 
governance mechanism for monitoring managers, prior research shows that 
results supporting this belief are mixed.  This section of the analysis confirms 
the stream of thought indicating a lack of a significant relationship between 
presence of the majority of independent directors on the Board and improved 
firm outcomes (Larcker & Tayan, 2011; Brown & Caylor, 2006) in the junior 
Canadian Life Sciences sector.   
CODEIND: 
 Using the second measure of Board independence, CODEIND, several 
significant associations (p<0.1) resulted from the univariate linear regression of 
the continuous dependent variables.  CODEIND was found to have an 
association with the market to book ratio, return on assets and cash debt 
coverage.  Regression models and results of these analyses are shown in 
Tables 11 to 13 below.                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                       
Table 11: Model Summary for Market to Book, ROA and Cash Debt 
Coverage on CODEIND  
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 – Market to Book  .256
a
 .065 .050 69.487 
2  - ROA .217
a
 .047 .031 12.074 
3 – Cash Debt Coverage .229
a
 .053 .037 2.803 
4- Debt Ratio .180
a
 .032 .016 11.428 




In the presence of control variables, the associations among the 
variables remained unchanged.  Table 11 shows that the proportions of the total 
variability in the market to book ratio, ROA and the cash debt coverage ratio that 
can be explained by CODEIND are 5.0%, 3.1%, and 3.7%, respectively, while 
debt ratio, with a non-significant association, was 1.6%.  
Table 12: ANOVA Results for Market to Book, ROA and Cash Debt 
Coverage on CODEIND 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 – Market to Book Regression 20293.360 1 20293.360 4.203 .045
a
 
Residual 289709.543 60 4828.492   
Total 310002.903 61    




Residual 8746.861 60 145.781   
 Total 9177.973 61    
3 – Cash Debt Regression 26.181 1 26.181 3.332 .073
a
 
       Coverage  
Residual 471.456 60 7.858   
 Total 497.637 61    
4 – Debt Ratio Regression 261.415 1 261.415 2.002 .162
a
 
        
Residual 7836.542 60 130.609   
 Total 8097.957 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CODEIND 
 
Analysis of the coefficients of the significant associations (Table 13) 
showed that the relationship between each dependent variable and CODEIND 
can be explained by the following models respectively:  
Market to Book Ratio = 77.165 – 23.343 (CODEIND); 
ROA = -12.651 + 3.402 (CODEIND); 
Cash Debt Coverage Ratio= 0.146 – 0.838 (CODEIND). 
These models indicate that both the market to book ratio and the cash debt 
coverage ratio have negative associations with CODEIND.  In the case of the 
market to book ratio, the results imply that, as the Board includes more outside 
56 
 
directors, the firm’s value decreases. This is consistent with previous research 
by Lacetera (2001) which indicated that inside Directors had intimate knowledge 
about the inner workings of a firm, and thus may be better equipped to lead the 
organization with appropriate strategies and resource allocation decisions, 
supporting the firm’s technology and operations in order to enhance innovation 
and drive firm growth.  These results do not support H1 or the prevailing belief in 
the investment community that Board independence is an indicator of good 
corporate governance. They do, however, document the unique characteristics 
of the Canadian Life Sciences sector and its requirement for industry expertise 
in top-level decision making.     






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1  
Market to Book 
(Constant) 77.165 30.505  2.530 .014 
CODEIND -23.343 11.386 -.256 -2.050 .045 
2  (Constant) -12.651 5.301  -2.387 .020 
 ROA 
CODEIND 3.402 1.978 .217 1.720 .091 
3  (Constant) .146 1.231  .119 .906 
 Cash Debt 
CODEIND -.838 .459 -.229 -1.825 .073 
 Coverage 
      
 
Similarly, the regression model indicates a negative association of cash 
debt coverage on CODEIND showing that, as Boards gain more outside 
directors, the cash debt coverage ratio is predicted to decrease. A higher cash 
debt coverage ratio is representative of better firm performance as it represents 
that amount of cash (liquidity) available from operations to cover a firm’s 
liabilities.  Thus, as the proportion of outside directors goes up, the model 
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predicts that the amount of cash available to cover a firm’s liabilities lowers, 
indicating worse firm performance.  The explanation for this observation is likely 
similar to that discussed above for the market to book ratio and may also be 
attributed to the fact that independence is often not clear-cut within the relatively 
small pool of specialized expertise and the relatively low availability of corporate 
directors to the Canadian Life Science industry.                 
 The marginally positive association between CODEIND and return on 
assets indicates that, as the number of independent directors increases, the 
profitability of the firm is predicted to increase, indicating management’s 
efficiency at utilizing its assets to generate earnings.  This association opposes 
the other two discussed in this section which may be due to the fact that most of 
the firms in the junior Canadian Life Sciences sector are not yet earning a profit 
(mean ROA for the data set of -3.03).  Only 6 of 62 firms showed a positive 
ROA for the period under investigation.  As such, the results could be 
interpreted to mean that ROA was less negative when Director independence 
was higher, or that ROA may not be an appropriate measure of firm 
performance for this industry sector.  Alternatively, this result may support 
Brown and Caylor (2004)’s findings that independent Boards have higher 
returns on equity and higher profit margins, suggesting that Board 
independence is associated with some important measures of firm performance.   
Further investigation would be beneficial in determining the impact of Board 
independence on ROA.  Expanding the data set to include the firms listed in the 
Canadian Life Sciences sector on the main TMX board, where firm profitability 
potential is higher would provide further insight.   
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 Logistic regression was used to regress the binary dependent variables 
MAJORREGAPPROVAL and PATENT (representing firm ownership of at least 
one major regulatory approval and at least one patent respectively) on 
CODEIND. Consistent with H1, no significant associations were identified, with 
or without inclusion of the control variables in the model (Tables 14 and 15).      
Table 14: Model Summary for Major Regulatory Approval and Patents on 
CODEIND 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 - MAJORREGAPPROVAL 82.039 .012 .016 
2- PATENT 85.365 .000 .000 
 
Table 15:  Coefficients with Major Regulatory Approval and Patents on 
CODEIND  





CODEIND -.282 .332 .723 1 .395 .754 
Constant .260 .882 .087 1 .769 1.297 
 2
 a
 -   
CODEIND -.021 .330 .004 1 .949 .979 
  PATENT 
Constant .248 .884 .079 1 .779 1.282 
 a. Variable(s) entered: CODEIND. 
 
Taken together, the results for %IND and CODEIND suggest that the 
dependent variables were generally unaffected by the proportion of outside 
Directors comprising the Board, which is consistent with both H1 and numerous 
findings in prior research (i.e., no consistent significant relationship has yet been 
identified linking Board independence to firm performance).  This is possibly due 
to the factors discussed above, or may be due to the fact that true Director 
independence is difficult to ascertain, particularly among industry experts and 
interrelationships in a small, specific industry sector such as the junior Canadian 
Life Sciences Industry.   
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Two regression models showed a negative association with CODEIND. 
This result should be taken into consideration by industry firms in ensuring that 
Boards of Directors maintain sufficient knowledge and involvement to make the 
best decisions for the firm.  The results in this section were unaffected by the 
presence of the control variables, possibly due to the fact that the firms in the 
sector under investigation are homogeneous, with too little variation to be visible 
in the sample.  As suggested above, expansion of this study to include the Life 
Sciences firms listed on the main TMX exchange over a period of several years 
instead of one year would produce more variability and provide further insight 
into the results reported herein.                
4.3.2. CEO Duality 
 Results of univariate linear regressions of the continuous dependent 
variables on CEO duality showed a significant association only between CEO 
duality and ROA (p=.095) at a significance value threshold of p<0.1, as shown 
in Table 16.  This finding is consistent with H2. No significant associations were 
evident with CEO duality and any of the other continuous dependant variables.  
Addition of the control variables into the regression model did not affect the test 







Table 16: Regression of ROA on CEO Duality; Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 























  2.341 50.073 .023 
 
Analysis of the coefficients (Table 17) showed that the relationship 
between CEO duality and ROA can be explained by the following model:  
 ROA = 0.207 – 6.077 (CEO Duality) 
indicating that, when the CEO and Chairman roles are held by the same 
individual (value = 0), ROA is higher than when the CEO and chairman roles are 
held by separate individuals (value = 1).   
 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .207 2.962  .070 .945 
CEODUALITY -6.077 3.581 -.223 -1.697 .095 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Tables 18 and 19 show the Chi Square test results for the binary 
dependent variables representing ownership of patents and of a major 
regulatory approval by the firm.  Neither dependent variable showed a 
significant relationship with CEO duality (p<0.1) with or without inclusion of the 















 1 .652   
Continuity Correction
b
 .027 1 .868   
Likelihood Ratio .204 1 .652   
Fisher's Exact Test    .777 .433 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.200 1 .654 
  
N of Valid Cases 57     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.21. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 












 1 .463   
Continuity Correction
b
 .196 1 .658   
Likelihood Ratio .545 1 .460   
Fisher's Exact Test    .567 .331 
Linear-by-Linear Association .529 1 .467   
N of Valid Cases 57     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.26. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 The presence of CEO duality, or the holding by a single individual of both 
the Chairman and the CEO roles within a firm, has been linked in the literature 
to weak governance structures in that agency problems have been deemed to 
be more likely to occur.  This study predicted that not only would CEO duality 
not have a negative impact on firm performance, but that “unfettered control” 
would actually effect a positive response due to the nature of the industry and 
the predilection of its founders to maintain a controlling hand in the firm, aligning 
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with shareholder interests for the long term.  The results of this section showed 
this hypothesis to be supported in one instance, when ROA was regressed on 
CEO duality.   
Using all other measures of the dependent variable, CEO duality had no 
statistically significant effect on firm performance.  This indicates that this 
corporate governance indicator is generally not predictive of firm performance in 
the junior Canadian Life Sciences sector and thus, its presence is neither a 
threat to, nor an indicator of, good corporate governance structures.  Therefore, 
Larker and Tayan (2011)’s advice that the value of separating the CEO and 
Chairman’s roles should be carefully considered by firms in terms of who the 
CEO is along with the structural, cultural and governance features of the 
company, is very relevant to the LSFs.    
 
4.3.3. Board Diversity  
The results from univariate linear regression analyses of the continuous 
dependent variables on Board diversity, as measured by the percentage of 
female directors, showed a significant association with the debt ratio, the market 
to book ratio, and return on assets.   No significant relationship was identified 
between the cash debt coverage ratio and the percentage of female directors. 
The models showing the proportion of variability in each dependent 
variable with and without inclusion of the control variables are in Table 20 
below. From these results, it is clear that the presence of control variables may 
have impacted the results and required consideration in the regression model.  
Using the adjusted R square value, the variance explained by proportion of 
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female directors in the debt ratio increased slightly to 14.9% from 12.5% in the 
presence of the control variables; in the market to book ratio, it increased to 
17.0% from 7.7%, and in ROA, it decreased from 15.0% to 10.5%, respectively.     
 
Table 20: Model Summary for Debt Ratio, Market to Book and ROA on 
Percentage Female Directors with and without Controls 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 – Debt Ratio .373
a
 .139 .125 10.779 
2 – Market to Book .303
a
 .092 .077 68.497 
3-  ROA .405
a
 .164 .150 11.310 
4 -  Debt Ratio with controls .468
b
 .219 .149 10.627 
5 – Market to book with controls .445
b
 .198 .170 10.493 
6 – ROA with controls .423
b
 .179 .105 11.602 
a. Predictors: (Constant), %FEMALE 
b. Predictors: (Constant), BLOCKHOLDER, REGREGIME, %FEMALE, BODSIZE, FIRMSIZE 
 
 Results of the of the Analyses of Variance showed that each of the 
measures of the dependent variable, i.e., debt ratio, market to book ratio, and 
ROA, are significantly associated with the percentage of female directors on the 












Table 21: ANOVA Results for Debt Ratio, Market to Book and ROA on 
Percentage Female Directors 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 – Debt Ratio Regression 1126.516 1 1126.516 9.695 .003
a
 
Residual 6971.441 60 116.191   
Total 8097.957 61    




Residual 281508.474 60 4691.808   
 Total 310002.903 61    




Residual 7675.546 60 127.926   
 Total 9177.973 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), %FEMALE 
 
Analysis of the coefficients (Table 22) showed that the relationship 
between each dependent variable and the percentage of female Directors can 
be explained by the following models:  
 Debt Ratio = 1.264 + 47.835 (% Female) 
Market to Book Ratio = 6.039 + 240.581 (% Female) 
ROA = -1.339 – 55.243 (% Female) 
The regression model showing the positive association between the debt ratio 
and the percentage female directors indicates that a higher percentage of 
female directors may be predictive of higher debt ratios and, as a result, more 
highly leveraged, higher risk firms, pointing towards lower performance.  This 
finding contradicts H3 and the inferences from prior research that Board 
diversity enhances firm performance.  Similarly, the regression model showed a 
negative relationship between return on assets and percentage female directors 
indicating that, as the percentage of female directors increases, ROA is 
predicted to decrease, lowering firm performance; also contradictory to H3.  
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There are several possible explanations for these results.  Larcker and Tayan 
(2011) note that the risk of “tokenism” in attempting to gender-balance the 
Board can result in recruiting under-qualified Directors.  They further note that 
increasing diversity in the Boardroom can detract from quality decision making 
due to smaller and lower quality information sharing, higher conflict and lack of 
common goals.  Since only 15 of the 62 firms considered in this study had 
female representation on the Board of Directors (mean 4.68%, max 40%), the 
percentage of female directors was generally underrepresented in this study.  
To further examine the meaning of these results, an expansion of the sample to 
include the LSFs listed on the main TSX exchange and expanding the 
investigation period to several years is recommended.  Alternatively, in 
consideration of the nature of the Life Sciences industry sector, Board diversity 
may be better measured using a different indicator, such as diversity within the 
core competencies and expertise of the directors.   
However, the regression model for the market to book ratio indicated that 
higher firm value is associated with a higher percentage of female directors, 
meaning that the investors value the presence of female directors, which is 
reflected in the market capitalization of the firm; a positive firm performance 







Table 22: Coefficients with Debt Ratio, Market to Book and ROA on 





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1  
DV: Debt Ratio 
(Constant) 1.264 1.546  .817 .417 
%FEMALE 47.835 15.363 .373 3.114 .003 
2  (Constant) 6.039 9.826  .615 .541 
DV: Market to 
book 
%FEMALE 240.581 97.623 .303 2.464 .017 
3  (Constant) -1.339 1.623  -.825 .412 
DV: ROA 
%FEMALE -55.243 16.120 -.405 -3.427 .001 
 
      
 
Each of the results reported in this section remained significant with the 
addition of control variables into the model, and no new significant relationships 
were identified among the dependent variables. A significant association was 
identified between a control variable, size of the Board of Directors, and both the 
debt and market to book ratios.  Table 23 shows that 17.0% of the variability in 
the debt ratio and 10.9% of the variability in the market to book ratio can be 
explained by the overall size and percentage females comprising the Board of 
Directors.  The results of the analyses of variance are presented in Table 24 
which shows the significance of the models at p<0.1.        
 
Table 23: Model Summary for Debt Ratio and Market to Book with Size of 
Board and Percentage Female Directors 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 – Debt Ratio .445
a
 .198 .170 10.494 
2 – Market to Book  .371
a
 .138 .109 67.305 





Table 24:  ANOVA Results for Debt Ratio and Market to Book on 
Percentage Female Directors and Size of the Board 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 – Debt Ratio Regression 1600.861 2 800.430 7.269 .002
a
 
Residual 6497.096 59 110.120   
Total 8097.957 61    




Residual 267267.314 59 4529.954   
 Total 310002.903 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODSIZE, %FEMALE 
 
Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 25) shows that the 
relationship between each dependent variable and the percentage of female 
directors and the size of the Board can be explained by the following models:  
Debt Ratio = 14.035 + 52.573 (%FEMALE) - 2.355 (BODSIZE); 
Market to Book Ratio = 76.018 + 266.537 (%FEMALE) – 12.906 
(BODSIZE) 
The size of the Board of Directors was negatively associated with both 
the debt ratio and the market to book ratio.  Thus, Board size and percentage of 
female directors on the Board have opposing effects on firm performance, 
according to these analyses.  As Board size increases, the debt ratio decreases 
(positive firm performance); however, as the percentage of female directors 
increases, so does the debt ratio (negative firm performance).  This result is 
consistent with Anderson, Manos and Reeb (2004)’s finding that the cost of a 
firm’s debt is inversely related to its Board size.   
Conversely, as Board size increases, the market to book ratio decreases 
(a negative performance indicator), while increasing the percentage of female 
directors predicts positive increases in the market to book ratio, according to the 
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regression model. These mixed results regarding gender diversity may be 
interpreted as consistent with Carter et al. (2010)’s observation that the effect of 
gender and ethnic diversity on firm financial performance is contingent on the 
circumstances and period of time. The fact that a control variable, Board size, is 
predictive of higher firm performance in terms of the debt ratio and lower firm 
performance in terms of the market to book ratio further supports this 
contingency theory of the effect of Board diversity on firm performance.  In 
particular, the debt ratio is generally high in this industry sector (mean 3.48) 
indicating that debt levels are, on average, three and a half times higher than 
total assets1.  Combined with the fact that female Board representation is low 
(mean 4.0%; max 40%), both factors may have impacted the results.  This 
warrants further investigation with an expanded data set.  Alternatively, 
extrapolation of Murphy and McIntyre (2007)’s suggestion that increasing Board 
independence can extend a firm’s network of contacts, directly impacting the 
ability of the Board to secure sources of funding could explain this inverse 
relationship with the debt ratio, since access to a wider range of funding sources 
might enable the firm to avoid undertaking debt. The negative effect of Board 
size on the market to book ratio may be the result of the firms in this industry 
sector being generally undervalued (low market to book ratio) due to under-
realization of the value of the firm’s products, technologies or intellectual 
property by the market or by virtue of their financial state, with high debt levels 
and low earnings.  Indeed, larger Boards have been associated with lower 
                                                 
1
 High debt ratios (greater than one) were present in seventeen of the sixty-two LSF firms 
studied.  Due to the long cycle times and high-cost activities required to bring Life Sciences 
products to commercialization, liabilities were, in several cases, significantly greater than assets, 
resulting in negative retained earnings for the firm. 
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involvement, lack of sufficient information sharing, and less effective monitoring 
and oversight (Larcker & Tayan, 2011), which could affect the market’s view of 
the firm’s value. 
 In sum, results of the regression analyses on H3 are mixed when 
considering the associations between continuous independent variables and the 
percentage of female directors on the Board.  This is not a surprising outcome 
given the mixed results in prior research. H3 is supported with the market to 
book ratio regression model and it is not supported in the models including 
return on assets and the debt ratio.  In the presence of control variables, the 
regression model is affected by the size of the Board in an opposing manner to 
percentage female directors when the debt and market book ratios are used as 
dependent variables.  
        
Table 25: Coefficients with Debt Ratio and Market to Book on Percentage 





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1  
DV: Debt Ratio 
(Constant) 14.035 6.335  2.216 .031 
%FEMALE 52.573 15.129 .410 3.475 .001 
 
BODSIZE -2.355 1.135 -.245 -2.075 .042 
2  (Constant) 76.018 40.632  1.871 .066 
DV: Market to 
book 
%FEMALE 266.537 97.035 .336 2.747 .008 
 
  BODSIZE -12.906 7.279 -.217 -1.773 .081 
 
 Regression analysis of the binary dependent variables, firm ownership of 
patents and of at least one major regulatory approval, indicated a significant 
relationship (p<0.1) between the percentage of females on the Board of 
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Directors and a major regulatory approval (Tables 26 and 27).  This association 
remained significant with control variables included in the regression model.  No 
significant association was found between patent ownership and the percentage 
of female directors.   
 Table 26: Model Summary for Major Regulatory Approval and 
Percentage of Female Directors 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 79.398 .053 .072 
 
Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 27) showed that the negative 
relationship predicted by this model contradicts H3, since it indicates that 
increasing the percentage of female directors will result in a decrease of 
major regulatory approval for the firm’s products, an important factor in LSF’s
growth strategy.  Consistent with governance literature, this result could be 
explained by Larcker and Tayan (2011)’s observation that, within 
heterogeneous Boards, lower quality information sharing, higher conflict and 
lack of common goals may be evident.  Alternatively, the low representation 
of females on the Boards included in the sample may have affected the 
results, creating a basis for further study.    
Table 27:  Coefficients with Major Regulatory Approval and Percentage 
of Female Directors  
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 FEMALE -6.247 3.801 2.701 1 .100 .002 
Constant -.216 .291 .548 1 .459 .806 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEMALE. 
 
 Overall, as with much of the prior research published to date, female 
representation on Boards has shown mixed results in this study.  Carter et al. 
71 
 
(2003) identified a significant positive relationship between women and 
minorities sitting on the Board and firm value.  However, their later study 
published in 2010, found no significant relationship.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that gender and ethnic diversity may have a contingent positive, negative, or 
neutral effect on firm performance under different circumstances at different 
periods of time (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010).  This could serve 
as an explanation to results in this study.    
4.3.4 Board Equity Ownership  
 Univariate linear regression of the continuous dependent variables was 
performed on two measures of Director Equity Ownership; average equity 
ownership by Directors (DIRAVEEQOWN) and percentage of equity owned by 
Directors in terms of the total number of outstanding shares 
(BODTOT%EQOWN). 
Average Equity Ownership by Directors 
 Results of the univariate linear regression of the continuous dependent 
variables on DIRAVEEQOWN showed that a significant relationship existed only 
with the cash debt coverage ratio, indicating that 3.5% of the total variance in 
the cash debt coverage ratio can be explained by the average equity ownership 
of the Board of Directors (Table 28).     
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Table 28: Model Summary for Cash Debt Coverage on Average Director 
Equity Ownership 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .225 .051 .035 2.806 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIRAVEQOWN 
 
Results of the Analyses of Variance (Table 29) showed that firm value, 
represented by the cash debt coverage ratio is associated with the average 
equity ownership by directors in the firm (p=0.079 at p<0.1).    
 
Table 29: ANOVA Results for Cash Debt Coverage on Average Director 
Equity Ownership  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 25.170 1 25.170 3.196 .079
a
 
Residual 472.467 60 7.874   
Total 497.637 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIRAVEQOWN 
b. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
 Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 30) shows that the 
relationship between the cash debt coverage ratio and average director equity 
ownership can be explained by the following model: 
 Cash Debt Coverage = -2.557 + 2.694 x 10-7 (DIRAVEQOWN) 
The positive association between these variables indicates that, as average 
equity ownership by directors increases, the cash debt coverage ratio will also 
increase, consistent with H4. A higher cash debt coverage ratio is 
representative of better firm performance as it denotes the amount of cash 
(liquidity) available from operations to cover a firm’s liabilities.  Thus, as average 
equity ownership by directors increases, the model predicts that the amount of 
cash available to cover a firm’s liabilities will also increase.  This finding is 
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consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2008)’s results and supports agency theory 
in that share ownership by directors aligns their interests with the other 
shareholders with a view to the long term.  Further, only when ownership and 
control are separate should corporate governance issues arise (McConnell, 
McKeon, & Xu, 2010), which is not an issue when directors are the owners.   







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1  
 
(Constant) -2.557 .472  -5.419 .000 
DIRAVEQOWN 2.694E-7 .000 .225 1.788 .079 
a. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
When control variables were included in the model, the above-noted 
relationship remained significant and no new significant relationships were 
identified between the dependent and independent variables. A significant 
association was, however, identified between a control variable, size of the 
Board of Directors, and cash debt coverage ratio.  Table 31 shows that the 
model predicts that 4.8% of the variability in the cash debt coverage ratio can be 
explained by the size of the Board and its average equity ownership  The results 
of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 32 which shows the 










Table 31: Model Summary for Cash Debt Coverage on Average Director 
Equity Ownership and Board Size 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 




 .079 .048 2.786 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODSIZE, DIRAVEQOWN 
 
 
Table 32: ANOVA b Results for Cash Debt Coverage on Average Director 
Equity Ownership and Board Size 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39.430 2 19.715 2.539 .088
a
 
Residual 458.207 59 7.766   
Total 497.637 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODSIZE, DIRAVEQOWN 
b. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
  Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 33) shows that the 
relationship between the cash debt coverage ratio and average director equity 
ownership can be explained by the following model: 
Cash Debt Coverage = -0.366 + 2.984 x 10-7 (DIRAVEQOWN) – 0.408 
(BODSIZE) 
This regression model predicts that the cash debt coverage ratio will, as 
discussed above, increase with a corresponding increase in average equity 
ownership by directors.  Having an opposite effect, the model shows through its 
negative relationship that, as the Board size increases, the cash debt coverage 
ratio will decrease, an indicator of poorer firm performance.  A similar 
relationship was found in the Board diversity regression model (section 4.3 
above); suggesting that deeper investigation into the effect of Board size on 
corporate governance indicators may be warranted in future research.       
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Table 33: Coefficients a with Cash Debt Coverage on Average Director 





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.366 1.683  -.218 .828 
DIRAVEQOWN 2.984E-7 .000 .249 1.974 .053 
BODSIZE -.408 .301 -.171 -1.355 .181 
a. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
 Logistic regression analysis of the binary dependent variables, firm 
ownership of patents and of at least one major regulatory approval, indicated a 
significant relationship (p=0.076 at p<0.1) between the average equity 
ownership by directors and ownership by the firm of at least one patent (Tables 
34 and 35).  This relationship remained significant when control variables were 
included in the regression model. This result could be interpreted to mean that 
average equity ownership by directors may be predictive of firm performance in 
terms of patent ownership.  It is more likely, however, that average directors’ 
equity ownership increases as a result of the firm receiving patent grants, from 
which a true source of value to the firm is derived. No significant association 
was found between holding a major regulatory approval and the average equity 
ownership of directors.   
 
Table 34: Model Summary for Patent and Average Director Equity 
Ownership 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 






Table 35:  Coefficients with Patent on Average Director Equity 
Ownership 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 DIRAVEQOWN .000 .000 3.145 1 .076 1.000 
Constant -.253 .348 .529 1 .467 .776 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DIRAVEQOWN. 
 
Total Percentage of Equity Ownership by Directors 
Results of univariate linear regression of the continuous dependent 
variables on BODTOT%EQOWN showed that, similar to average director equity 
ownership, a significant relationship existed only with the cash debt coverage 
ratio, indicating that 6.5% of the total variance in the cash debt coverage ratio 
can be explained by the total percentage equity ownership of the Board of 
Directors (Table 36).                                        
Table 36: Model Summary for Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 
Director Equity Ownership 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .283
a
 .080 .065 2.762 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODTOT%EQOWN 
 
Results of the of the Analyses of Variance (Table 37) showed that firm 
value, represented by the cash debt coverage ratio, is significantly associated 










Table 37: ANOVA Results for Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 
Director Equity Ownership  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39.837 1 39.837 5.221 .026
a
 
Residual 457.801 60 7.630   
Total 497.637 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODTOT%EQOWN 
b. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
 Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 38) shows that the 
relationship between the cash debt coverage ratio and total percentage of 
director equity ownership can be explained by the following model: 
 Cash Debt Coverage = -2.826 + 3.976 (BODTOT%EQOWN) 
The positive association between these variables indicates that, as the total 
percentage of equity ownership by directors increases, the cash debt coverage 
ratio will also increase, consistent with H4 and with the regression models 
representing average director equity ownership.  
Table 38: Coefficients with Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 











(Constant) -2.826 .502  -5.624 .000 
BODTOT%EQOWN 3.976 1.740 .283 2.285 .026 
a. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
When control variables were included in the model, the above-noted 
relationship remained significant and no new significant relationships were 
identified. A significant association was identified between a control variable, 
size of the Board of Directors, and cash debt coverage ratio.  Table 39 shows 
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that the model predicts that 9.2% of the variability in the cash debt coverage 
ratio can be explained by the size of the Board and its total percent of equity 
ownership by directors.  The results of the analysis of variance is presented in 
Table 40 which shows the significance of the model at p<0.1 (p=0.021).        
 
Table 39: Model Summary for Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 
Director Equity Ownership and Board Size 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .350
a
 .122 .092 2.721 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODSIZE, BODTOT%EQOWN 
 
 
Table 40: ANOVA b Results for Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 
Director Equity Ownership and Board Size 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 60.796 2 30.398 4.106 .021
a
 
Residual 436.842 59 7.404   
Total 497.637 61    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BODSIZE, BODTOT%EQOWN 
b. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
  Analysis of the regression coefficients (Table 41) shows that the 
relationship between the cash debt coverage ratio and total percentage director 
equity ownership can be explained by the following model: 
Cash Debt Coverage = -0.193 + 4.646 (BODTOT%EQOWN) – 
0.503(BODSIZE) 
This regression model predicts that the cash debt coverage ratio will, as 
discussed above, increase with a corresponding increase in total percentage of 
equity ownership by directors.  The model also shows through its negative 
relationship that, as the Board size increases, the cash debt coverage ratio will 
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decrease.  Explanation of these results follows the same reasoning as was 
discussed above in the average director equity ownership section.  Thus, H4 is 
supported.   
Table 41: Coefficients a with Cash Debt Coverage on Total Percentage 





t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.193 1.642  -.117 .907 
BODTOT%EQOWN 4.646 1.760 .331 2.640 .011 
BODSIZE -.503 .299 -.211 -1.682 .098 
a. Dependent Variable: CASHDEBTCOVERAGE 
 
Results of the logistic regression analysis of the dependent variables on 
total percentage equity ownership by the Board showed no significant 
associations either with or without inclusion of control variables in the model  
In sum, similar associations were evident using average equity ownership 
by directors and total percentage share ownership by the Board as measures of 
director ownership in the firm.  Significant positive relationships were identified 
between both independent variables and the cash debt coverage ratio, a 
positive firm performance indicator.  These results are consistent with H4 and 
with Agency Theory.  Other tested associations were not significant. It can be 
concluded that equity ownership by directors may enhance firm performance in 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The purpose of this study was to determine whether good corporate 
governance practices are associated with firm performance in the growth- 
oriented firms of the junior Canadian Life Sciences sector.  An examination of 
whether firm performance is a function of its governance characteristics was 
conducted by testing four specific hypotheses.  Results from this study revealed 
several distinguishing characteristics of the junior LSFs listed on the TSX 
Venture Exchange.  In general, these firms are implementing corporate 
governance best practices as modelled by Agency Theory.  The prevalence of 
the proportion of firms with majority independent Directors (72.6%), the 
proportion of firms separating the CEO and Chairman’s roles (68.4%) and 
relatively high average equity ownership by Directors (20.7%), aligning the 
interests of the Board with the shareholders, are evidence of this trend. Few 
firms (mean 4.0%) embraced gender diversity as the corporate governance best 
practice associated with Board diversity.  With these results, it appears that the 
junior, high-growth oriented firms under investigation are aiming at implementing 
what is perceived to be the right governance structures to drive performance of 
the firm toward success.  What isn’t clear, neither from prior research nor from 
the results of this study, is whether the presence of single corporate governance 
best practices can drive good firm performance.  
 The results of this study showed that maintaining a majority of outside, 
independent directors has no significant effect on firm performance and may be 
more apt to produce poorer results as the percentage of independent directors 
increases.  This is a finding of note for the Life Science industry as it is likely a 
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function of the sector, where inside, specialized expertise is valuable in setting 
strategic direction for the firm. Although the individual regression models varied 
in terms of the predictive value of maintaining a majority of independent 
directors on the Board, H1 was generally supported, indicating that this Board 
structure characteristic has no effect on firm performance.  
 Investigation of the effect of CEO duality in this study indicated that this 
governance characteristic has minimal effect on firm performance, except in 
association with return on assets where it was found that better firm 
performance could be predicted when the CEO and Chairman roles were held 
by a single individual.  This finding supported H2.  Generally, no positive or 
negative impact on firm performance was identified when the roles were 
separated.  Thus, for the junior Canadian Life Sciences industry, CEO duality, or 
lack thereof, should be contingent upon the firms’ situation.          
 Gender diversity on the Board was low in the study sample, but several 
significant relationships were identified. Contrary to recent corporate 
governance literature, results show that gender diversity may have a dampening 
effect on firm performance in the junior Canadian Life Sciences sector, contrary 
to H3.  These results warrant further investigation with an expanded sample 
size.     
 The most consistent finding in this study was that higher equity 
ownership by Directors is predictive of better firm performance, consistent with 
the idea that the gap in the separation between ownership and control is 
minimized when the Directors are also owners of the firm.   
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 In conclusion, this study provides preliminary evidence that several 
significant associations exist linking firm performance with corporate 
governance characteristics in the junior Canadian Life Sciences industry.  It is 
recommended that these findings be used to seek a more definitive answer to 
the central research question.  In some circumstances, good corporate 
governance practices were associated with positive firm performance in the 
industry.  In other circumstances, the effect of the governance practices was 
neutral or negative.  These mixed findings are consistent with the prior 
corporate governance literature which claims that although corporate 
governance best practices are thought to lead to superior firm performance, 
consistent proof of this association has not yet been identified and may be 
contingent on specific circumstances within the firm or the industry as a whole.   
Further research in this area is recommended, using the results of this 
study as a starting point.  Next steps would include expanding the sample to 
include LSFs listed on the main TSX stock exchange over a period of several 
years to seek more definitive associations between the variables investigated in 
the study.  Better definition of the identified associations may be used as 
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APPENDIX: Complete Data Set 
 











































































































































1 5 $15,729,000 0 2 0 0 0.08 9.28 -1.20 -1.76 80% 3 1 0 286,139 1.97%
2 4 $149,000 0 0 0 0 1.27 43.91 -4.88 -1.72 75% 3 1 0 65,675 0.34%
3 5 $19,751 1 0 0 0 63.64 24.67 -2.77 -0.57 60% 3 0 20% 563,532 40.49%
4 5 $157,455 0 1 1 1 0.78 12.62 -7.83 -1.59 60% 3 20% 913,193 59.76%
5 6 $2,194,615 0 1 1 1 2.22 1.11 -6.94 -0.63 50% 2 1 0% 4,426,454 43.72%
6 6 $395,092 0 0 1 1 11.68 15.91 -10.94 -0.45 50% 2 1 17% 1,119,500 6.95%
7 7 $1,106,000 0 1 0 1 0.15 44.32 -2.31 -12.68 57% 3 0 0% 926,810 18.53%
8 5 $5,227,000 0 1 1 1 0.11 2.44 -2.56 -7.70 60% 3 1 0% 238,692 1.36%
9 5 $1,585,000 0 1 1 0 0.27 1.80 0.91 1.76 60% 3 0 0% 322,772 23.43%
10 6 $7,323,000 0 2 1 1 0.61 0.95 -2.11 -0.58 50% 2 1 0% 344,211 2.81%
11 5 $638,000 0 1 1 0 0.85 5.11 -2.89 0.16 80% 3 0 0% 967,005 32.61%
12 6 $164,242 0 1 0 0 0.43 4.49 -1.04 -1.58 33% 1 0% 286,469 30.33%
13 6 $798,000 1 2 1 1 1.22 4.37 -2.80 -0.13 50% 2 1 0% 9,659,589 74.85%
14 5 $4,171,000 0 0 0 1 0.88 1.23 0.41 0.23 80% 3 1 0% 906,649 7.52%
15 7 $45,760,000 1 2 0 0 0.39 0.62 0.44 0.02 57% 3 0 0% 6,880,995 73.42%
16 6 $5,964,000 0 0 1 1 0.46 1.12 -1.29 -1.30 50% 2 1 0% 1,840,096 13.27%
17 8 $41,149,000 1 0 0 1 0.01 0.38 -1.10 -5.75 75% 3 1 13% 2,299,271 24.71%
18 8 $1,202,000 1 1 0 0 3.36 27.40 -23.73 -0.59 88% 3 1 25% 1,969,059 11.96%
19 6 $6,460,000 0 1 0 1 0.06 9.81 -1.49 -7.58 83% 3 0 0% 152,858 1.95%
20 5 $6,607,000 0 1 0 1 0.36 2.71 0.23 0.61 60% 3 1 40% 9,188,637 77.05%
21 4 $2,733,000 1 1 0 0 2.25 3.03 -2.30 -0.86 75% 3 1 0% 53,127 0.41%
22 5 $1,260,000 1 0 0 1 0.29 6.68 -4.25 -4.73 80% 3 20% 221,776 4.22%
23 4 $37,974,000 0 2 0 0 1.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 50% 1 0 0% 1,435,834 45.53%
24 8 $2,765,000 1 2 0 0 2.01 1.26 -1.52 -0.28 63% 3 1 13% 2,565,576 44.03%
25 5 $4,776,000 1 1 1 0 0.07 0.57 0.10 1.46 80% 3 0 0% 586,350 11.87%
26 5 $2,946,000 0 1 1 0 0.09 4.04 -0.97 -7.07 80% 3 1 0% 452,957 4.86%
27 6 $19,932,000 0 2 0 1 0.40 0.71 0.01 0.29 83% 3 0 0% 5,843,075 50.86%
28 7 $7,142,000 0 0 0 0 0.29 2.49 -1.07 -3.01 86% 3 1 14% 673,222 8.73%
29 7 $1,247,000 0 0 0 0 0.46 15.28 -1.58 -2.63 71% 3 1 0% 813,681 22.13%
30 6 $4,666,000 1 1 1 1 0.15 5.76 -2.76 -4.61 83% 3 0 0% 902,955 11.08%
31 4 $2,471,000 0 0 0 1 0.04 2.08 -1.95 -10.22 100% 3 1 0% 469,429 3.10%
32 6 $2,263,000 1 0 0 1 0.68 6.42 -15.61 -2.06 83% 3 1 0% 349,334 5.77%
33 4 $959,000 0 0 0 0 0.41 2.43 14.26 0.25 75% 3 0 0% 981,870 5.06%
34 4 $4,744,000 0 1 1 1 1.38 20.25 9.08 0.02 75% 3 0 0% 8,011,175 17.52%
35 6 $4,341,000 1 1 1 1 0.69 1.58 -0.47 -0.28 83% 3 1 0% 3,586,501 62.89%
36 5 $2,970,230 1 2 1 1 3.93 6.60 4.52 -0.13 40% 1 1 0% 864,229 1.10%
37 4 $762,000 0 1 1 1 6.90 2.09 -4.15 0.02 75% 3 1 0% 1,932,013 21.86%
38 5 $1,954,000 0 0 1 0 0.97 2.85 -2.43 -1.60 80% 3 1 0% 237,000 1.27%
39 6 $6,300,000 0 2 1 0 0.15 9.43 -1.96 -1.88 67% 3 1 17% 870,024 11.42%
40 7 $304,000 0 1 0 0 2.54 5.44 -5.47 -0.08 86% 3 1 0% 2,246,704 33.31%
41 6 $2,543,000 0 1 0 0 0.56 1.77 -0.44 -0.77 67% 3 1 0% 2,913,038 27.13%
42 6 $397,000 1 1 0 1 5.90 28.50 -17.80 -1.07 50% 2 1 17% 6,068,627 25.75%
43 8 $61,586,000 0 1 1 0 0.45 0.70 0.14 0.16 88% 3 0 0% 208,213 19.99%
44 5 $6,212,513 0 1 1 1 0.29 0.18 -0.24 0.37 40% 1 1 0% 654,400 19.31%
45 4 $276,000 1 0 0 1 9.29 12.06 -6.90 -0.36 75% 3 1 0% 378,178 1.82%
46 5 $3,977,000 0 0 0 1 0.03 4.06 -1.00 -6.85 60% 3 1 0% 526,583 2.20%
47 7 $3,432,000 1 0 0 1 0.21 2.90 -5.20 -5.02 57% 3 1 14% 2,391,200 21.01%
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48 7 $1,805,000 0 0 0 1 3.14 7.05 -9.07 -1.09 57% 3 1 0% 6,402,496 14.09%
49 7 $7,530,000 0 1 1 0 0.14 6.35 -2.67 -3.71 71% 3 1 0% 982,457 17.27%
50 6 $1,523,000 1 1 0 1 0.45 8.80 -2.20 -3.34 50% 2 0 0% 1,148,375 15.17%
51 6 $2,764,000 0 1 0 1 0.13 33.76 -1.63 -5.49 83% 3 0 0% 3,273,507 10.52%
52 6 $3,921,000 0 2 0 0 0.08 0.73 -0.37 -2.87 50% 2 17% 6,810,083 56.75%
53 6 $12,522,000 0 0 0 0 0.83 0.18 0.37 -0.16 67% 3 1 0% 32,170 0.60%
54 4 $922,000 0 0 1 0 7.22 16.19 -1.43 0.05 50% 1 1 0% 1,370,575 9.55%
55 4 $1,079,000 0 1 1 1 0.89 13.52 -2.11 -1.68 50% 1 1 0% 4,830,185 46.35%
56 5 $5,721,000 1 0 0 1 0.19 14.21 -1.37 -4.97 60% 3 0 0% 2,083,258 15.38%
57 6 $2,436,000 0 0 1 0 1.95 7.30 -3.96 -0.88 83% 3 1 0% 2,487,820 13.86%
58 3 $1,024,000 0 2 0 0 0.20 0.50 -0.42 -1.38 33% 0 0 0% 8,542 0.37%
59 5 $8,761,000 0 1 0 1 0.08 4.85 -4.65 -4.54 80% 3 20% 2,054,319 15.96%
60 4 $8,174,000 0 1 0 1 0.39 0.07 3.18 -0.21 75% 3 1 0% 3,988 0.08%
61 4 $62,000 0 1 0 0 65.94 563.55 -89.79 -0.25 50% 1 1 25% 3,049,944 16.76%
62 4 $723,000 1 1 0 1 5.32 32.19 -3.38 -1.00 50% 1 0 0% 3,049,944 17.82%
